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ABSTRACT: The occasions on which a judge or legal scholar has peered
into the depths of the Constitution and found, to her surprise, that the
Constitution requires the opposite of her ideologicalpreferences, are extremely
rare. Yetjudges andscholars continue to present their conclusions as the product
of ideologically neutralreasoning, while often criticizingthe ideological bias in
the reasoningof their opponents. A Wittgensteinianperspective on the nature of
legal discourse can shed light on this puzzlingly persistentstate of affairs. Legal
discourse, including constitutional argument, is partly defined by the blending
ofdescriptive reasoningabout what the law is with prescriptivereasoningabout
what the law ought to be. To reach a legal conclusion based on a blend of
descriptive and prescriptive reasoning, and to phrase this conclusion as purely
descriptive, as legal actors habitually do, is not to violate the rules of legal
discourse, but to abide by them. Taking this conception of legal discourse as a
starting point, the Article extends Sanford Levinson's analogy between U.S.
constitutionalism and religiousfaith. Just as we can distinguish at least three

*
Cornell University, Ph.D., English, anticipated 2018; Harvard Law School, LD., magna cum
laude, 2010. I am grateful to Eric Berger, Richard Fallon, Duncan Kennedy, Sanford Levinson,

Lewis Sargentich, Pierre Schlag, Joseph Singer, David Skover, and Mark Tushnet for responses to
an earlier draft. I would like to dedicate this Article to the memories of two teachers who shaped
its arguments: Gordon Baker, who introduced me to the later Wittgenstein, and Richard Rorty, who
introduced me to American philosophy.
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attitudes toward a religious belief-fundamentalism, atheism, and nonfundamentalistfaith-so we can distinguish at least three analogousapproaches
to legal and constitutionaldiscourse. Jack Balkin's Constitutional Redemption
illustrates the often neglected possibility of a constitutional faith without
fundamentalism.
I.

INTRODUCTION

When progressive judges and legal scholars scrutinize the Constitution,
nearly all discover largely progressive meanings, while conservative judges and
legal scholars tend to discover correspondingly conservative meanings. The
occasions on which a judge or legal scholar has peered into the depths of the
Constitution and found, to her surprise, that the Constitution requires the
opposite of her ideological preferences, are extremely rare.I
These observations should by now be uncontroversial. The role of
personal values in judging has been a commonplace for well over a century, as
legal realists have repeatedly and persuasively demonstrated the indeterminacy
of the doctrinal materials that judges habitually present as the determinants of
the outcome of a case. 2 The evidence that judges fill this indeterminacy in part
based on their personal ideological preferences is no longer merely anecdotal.
Decades of empirical research by political scientists and other scholars support
what the realists have always claimed.3 The case for the role of judicial ideology
in constitutional adjudication is especially strong.4 Even those who defend the
I

For an expression of these general observations with an enduringly clever title, see Henry
P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 358 (1981) (criticizing prominent
legal scholars for believing that "the constitution is essentially perfect" at least in the sense of
guaranteeing "most equality and autonomy values which the commentators think a twentieth
century Western liberal democratic government ought to guarantee"). For one of the rare examples
of a legal scholar discovering ideologically unwelcome materials in the Constitution and refusing
to evade or downplay their significance, see Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989) (concluding that the Second Amendment "may be
profoundly embarrassing" to "those of us supporting prohibitory regulation" of firearms and also
"committed to zealous adherence to the Bill of Rights").
2
See Brian Leiter, In Praise ofRealism (and Against "Nonsense"Jurisprudence), 100 GEO.

L.J. 865, 872 (2012).
3
See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES (2013); Keith E.
Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: PostbehavioralistApproaches to Judicial Politics, 25

LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 601, 620 (2000) (noting that "several decades of research have helped
provide empirical support for the kind of claims about legal indeterminacy and judicial
politicization that the legal realists only asserted").
4
In the words of Judge Richard Posner, "[t]he evidence of the influence of policy judgments,
and hence of politics, on constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court lies everywhere at hand."
Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A PoliticalCourt, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 46 (2005). I note that I
will use the term "ideology" throughout this Article not in any of the sophisticated senses

associated with, for example, Marx or the Frankfurt School, but simply as shorthand for the
defining political, cultural, and economic views of one or another political grouping. Ideological
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possibility of formalist approaches to the law often acknowledge the accuracy of
legal realism as a description of the current practice of constitutional
interpretation on the Supreme Court.
Likewise, the powerful role of ideological preferences in constitutional
law scholarship should not come as a surprise. The words of Paul Brest over
three decades ago remain true today: most of the claims of constitutional law
scholars "are not political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs
ultimately designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the
public good." 6 This includes constitutional theory, which has engaged in a
predictable, decades-long dance with the ideological course of constitutional
adjudication. As Barry Friedman has recounted in persuasive detail, "[w]hen the
ideological valence of Supreme Court decisions shifts, constitutional theorizing
about judicial review tends to shift as well." 7 During the conservative Lochner
era on the Supreme Court, progressive judges, scholars, and activists decried
aggressive judicial review, and some called for taking the Constitution back from
the courts by ending or radically curtailing judicial review of federal legislation.

preferences can be distinguished from mere partisan (party-based) preferences. For the purposes
of this Article, the most important ideological split in the contemporary United States remains the
one between Left and Right, that is, between "progressives" (or "liberals") who, very generally
speaking, favor interfering in traditional social and economic hierarchies to promote greater
equality between groups; and "conservatives" who, again very generally speaking, oppose such
liberal interventions, often in the name of individual freedom or, more controversially, the defense
of the hierarchies themselves. When judges and scholars accuse one another of bias, the accusation
is almost always made across, and in terms of, such political-ideological lines.
5
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States FederalCourts in Interpretingthe Constitution andLaws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 32, 37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (lamenting that the Supreme

Court so often disregards the logic of its precedents "in order that the Constitution might mean
what it ought to mean," and that "[t]he American people have been converted to belief in The
Living Constitution, a 'morphing' document that means, from age to age, what it ought to mean").
6
Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981). As in the case of
adjudication, so in the case of legal scholarship, the evidence of the correlation between ideological
preference and interpretive outcomes is no longer merely anecdotal. See Adam S. Chilton & Eric
A. Posner, An Empirical Study ofPolitical Bias in Legal Scholarship (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law

and

Econ.,

Working

Paper

No.

696,

2014),

http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2376&context-lawandecono
mics.
Barry Friedman, The Cycles of ConstitutionalTheory, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer

2004, at 149, https://scholarship.law.duke.edulcp/vo167/iss3/9/; accord Keith E. Whittington,
Herbert Wechsler's Complaint and the Revival of Grand Constitutional Theory, 34 U. RICH. L.

REv. 509, 509-17 (2000).
8

See Brian Z. Tamahana, The ProgressiveStruggle with Courts: A ProblematicAsymmetry

1 (Washington Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 14-05-06, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2439395 (citing J.
Patrick White, Progressivism and the Judiciary: A Study of the Movement for Judicial Reform,
1901-1917 (1957) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan)) (noting that
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When the Supreme Court turned in more progressive directions during the
Warren Court era, progressive legal scholars warmed to the notion of judicial
review and sought ways to defend it as principled and democratic. 9 As the
Supreme Court has once again veered in a more conservative direction, calls by
progressive legal scholars for an end to judicial supremacy have returned.' 0
Indeed, one of the only places where one can find a denial of the role of
ideological preference in constitutional adjudication and scholarship is in judges'
and legal scholars' protestations of their own lack of ideological bias. As Judge
Posner notes, "most judges are cagey, even coy, in discussing what they do. They
tend to parrot an official line about the judicial process (how rule-bound it is),
and often to believe it, though it does not describe their actual practices.""

"[p]rogressives at the turn of the twentieth century . .. urged a host of reforms to trim judicial
power," including, for example, "elimination of judicial review"); Friedman, supra note 7, at 157
(stating that from 1890 to 1937, "[p]rogressives were troubled" by judicial review, while
"conservatives admired its preservationist and anti-democratic character"). Justice Holmes'
Thayerian dissent in Lochner illustrates the progressive hostility to aggressive judicial review. See
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (proposing that legislation
should be upheld "unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law").
9
See Friedman, supra note 7, at 157-58 (noting that after 1937, "[a]ll of the sudden, liberals
were for judicial review, though admittedly angst-ridden about how to justify it"); Whittington,
supra note 7, at 514 (noting that constitutional theorists were "substantively more sympathetic to
the actions of the Warren Court" and thus focused on "legitimat[ing] activist judicial review").
10
See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS

(1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core ofthe Case Against JudicialReview, 115 YALEL.J. 1346, 1348
(2006); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (2011) [hereinafter LEVINSON,

FAITH] (raising the possibility of a "protestant" constitutionalism that denies the Supreme Court
"is the dispenser of ultimate interpretation"). Cass Sunstein's advocacy of "judicial minimalism"
can also be seen as a way of preserving Warren Court gains against erosion by more conservative
justices. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999). The more minimalist our relatively conservative Supreme Court is today, the less
it will move constitutional doctrine away from the progressive (and decidedly non-minimalist)
achievements of earlier Courts. Id. Some progressive scholars working in the era of the Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts have questioned whether the Constitution deserves our fidelity at all. See, e.g.,
Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012); Michael J. Klarman,

Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997).
"

RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 2 (2008). The default rhetorical mode of

constitutional adjudication remains as Justice Louis Brandeis is said to have described Supreme
Court decision making in general: even "if you're only fifty-five percent convinced of a
proposition, you have to act and vote as if you were one hundred percent convinced." Mark
Tushnet, "I Couldn't See It Until I Believed It": Some Notes on Motivated Reasoning in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 125 HARV. L. REv. F. 1, 4 n.13 (2011) (quoting Brad Snyder, The
Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from Gray to Brandeis to
Friendly to Roberts, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1149, 1188 n.235 (2010)); accord Robert A. Ferguson, The
Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 213 (1990) (describing the
"rhetoric of inevitability" in judicial writing). For the continuing prevalence of a rhetoric of
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Constitutional law scholars whose antennae are subtly attuned to the presence of
unstated ideological presuppositions in the opinions ofjudges and other scholars
routinely insist upon the neutrality of their own interpretations. 1 2
In sum, the usual rhetoric of constitutional scholarship and adjudication
asks us to believe, as Louis Michael Seidman observes with appropriate
skepticism,
that it is no more than coincidence that the supposedly good faith
and politically neutral effort of both sides to understand the same
eighteenth-century text leads each side to read it in a fashion that
embodies its own contestable political programs while
delegitimating the programs of its adversaries. Or, more
precisely, we are asked by each side to believe that its
disinterested reading leads to this result, while the other side's
manipulation of text and history amounts to a cynical, politically
motivated effort to distort the Constitution's true meaning.13
What are we to make of this widely acknowledged, empirically
confirmed, yet routinely unaddressed state of affairs? Our judges appear to be
politically biased in their constitutional adjudication, despite their rhetoric of
rule-bound neutrality, and our constitutional scholars' conclusions appear
distorted by political considerations in a way that conflicts with scholarly
standards elsewhere in the university. How can we not be scandalized?
This Article takes a novel approach to the role of ideological reasoning
in constitutional adjudication and legal scholarship. Part I begins by proposing a
reconceptualization of the nature of legal discourse, drawing on Ludwig
Wittgenstein's discussion of religious belief in his Lectures on Religious Belief 14
In the Lectures, Wittgenstein suggests that we should not be misled by superficial
similarities between religious beliefs and ordinary beliefs, such as belief in

certainty in constitutional adjudication, see Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of ConstitutionalAbsolutism,
56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 667 (2015). Berger's advocacy of the use of a "more compromising
constitutional discourse" that honestly recognizes the indeterminacy of constitutional
interpretation through the use of "[m]ore equivocal language" roughly equates, in this Article's
terms, to the argument that more constitutional adjudication should be produced from a stance of
candid constitutional atheism. Id. at 751, 757; see infra Part IV (discussing this argument).
12
See infra Section III.B. Even the legal realists, despite their concentrated awareness of the
role of personal political preferences in legal interpretation, sometimes seemed to be blind to the
role of those preferences in policy decisions. The realists "embrace[d] wholeheartedly the idea that
judges make law," rather than simply finding it through deduction from the legal materials, but
"often made it seem as if judges could make . .. policy and precedential judgments without
injecting personal political commitments into their decisionmaking." Joseph William Singer, Legal
Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 502 (1988). Singer also suggests that it remained "explosive,"
at least in 1988, "to claim that law is a form of politics." Id. at 467.
13

SEIDMAN, supra note 10, at 7.

14

See infra note 25.
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scientific facts. 15 Closer attention to the reasons that religious believers offer for
their beliefs and the attitude they adopt toward their beliefs suggests that
referring to religious beliefs as "beliefs" may obscure as much as it reveals. A
believer who affirms a religious claim and perhaps even defines her life around
it may, for example, acknowledge that she lacks ordinary evidence for the claim
and deny that any amount of evidence could dissuade her.
Extending Wittgenstein's elusive remarks, Part I suggests that there are
at least three possible attitudes toward a religious claim. First, there is
fundamentalism, which insists that the claim is not only true, but literally true,
and true in the same way as any other descriptive claim, including the claims of
science. Fundamentalism denies that one's faith is a faith. Second, there is
atheism, which agrees with fundamentalism that there is no significant difference
between religious claims and scientific claims, but concludes on this basis that
religious claims are invalidated by the evidence and therefore simply false.
Finally, there is faith without fundamentalism, which recognizes differences
between a religious claim and a scientific claim and maintains faith in the
religious claim despite its lack of scientific support. Only the non-fundamentalist
recognizes the possibility that religious belief might constitute its own "form of
life" (to use a Wittgensteinian term of art) with its own distinct norms.
Part II then draws a comparison between legal discourse and religious
belief As in the case of religious belief, it is easy to be misled by the superficial
features of legal discourse into believing that the statements of the law made by
attorneys and judges are no different from any other descriptive statements.
Indeed, legal conclusions appear, when viewed in isolation, to be purely
descriptive. They present themselves simply as statements of what the law is, not
what the speaker believes the law should be. Closer attention to the contexts in
which these legal conclusions are asserted, however, shows that they are a
different breed: an undifferentiated amalgam of description and prescription.
Legal conclusions are fundamentally different from purely descriptive
assertions about the law. The social practice of making legal assertions is
distinguished by the intermingling of the descriptive and the prescriptive, of
assertions about what is and assertions about what should be. To base a legal
conclusion regarding what the law is in part on one's view of what the law should
be is not a violation of the rules governing this social practice. Rather, it is to
abide by the rules. Accordingly, to say that legal conclusions incorporating
prescriptive considerations are invalid for that reason is to misunderstand what
it means to make a legal assertion, just as one would misunderstand religious
faith if one were to say that a religious claim can only be a valid object of faith
if it is based on sufficient scientific evidence.
Based on this background, Part III turns to claims about the contents of
the U.S. Constitution. Statements made by judges and advocates about
constitutional meaning are a subset of legal conclusions. As with all legal

1s

See infra Part 1.
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conclusions, it is proper for constitutional interpretations to be based in part on
the speaker's views of what the Constitution should mean. This is simply the way
that constitutional interpretation, as a type of legal discourse, works. The
blending of description and prescription is part of the "form of life" of making a
legal assertion about the contents of the Constitution, as opposed to a purely
descriptive assertion.
Not all interpreters of the Constitution adopt the same attitude toward
their legal claims. Echoing the tripartite distinction above, we can distinguish at
least three attitudes to any given interpretation of constitutional meaning.
"Constitutional fundamentalism" assumes that constitutional interpretations are
purely descriptive claims. Whether true or false, accurate or inaccurate, they are
descriptive claims about what is the case, not prescriptive claims about what
should be the case. To adopt a fundamentalist attitude toward an interpretation
with which one agrees is to insist that the interpretation is simply the most
descriptively accurate interpretation available, and that this descriptive accuracy
is a sufficient basis for adopting the interpretation over its competitors-when,
in fact, the interpretation depends for its appeal in part on considerations about
what should be the case, and someone with different prescriptive preferences
from one's own could very well arrive at a conflicting interpretation that would
be no less well-supported by descriptive reasons. Just as the religious
fundamentalist insists that science supports her religious beliefs, and thus refuses
to see her faith as faith, the constitutional fundamentalist insists that purely
descriptive reasoning supports her legal conclusions about the Constitution's
meaning, and thus refuses to see her legal conclusions as legal conclusions.
"Constitutional atheism" accepts the fundamentalist premise that
constitutional interpretations can and should be judged solely by their descriptive
accuracy, but finds that nearly all contested constitutional interpretations fail by
this standard-usually because they assert a determinate conclusion where none
exists. To adopt an atheist attitude toward a constitutional interpretation is to
deny the descriptive accuracy of the interpretation without believing that some
other, competing interpretation could succeed where the first fails. It is to see the
entire enterprise as hopeless from the start, just as the religious atheist views the
search for scientific support for miracles or deities as hopeless regardless of the
identity of the deity or the nature of the miracle under discussion.
Finally, a "constitutional faith without fundamentalism" rejects the
shared fundamentalist-atheist notion that constitutional interpretations can and
should be judged solely by their descriptive accuracy. To adopt an attitude of
non-fundamentalist constitutional faith toward a constitutional interpretation is
to recognize that purely descriptive considerations may be insufficient to
demonstrate the superiority of the interpretation over its alternatives, to
acknowledge the role of prescriptive reasoning in one's preference for the
interpretation, but to persist in believing that the interpretation is the best
available, and to remain committed to it.
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RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND LEGAL FUNDAMENTALISM

Religious Beliefs Versus OrdinaryBeliefs

The aspect of religious fundamentalism that interests me here is the
fundamentalist's insistence that the claims in her sacred religious texts are not
only true, but literally true, and even supported by science. 16 They are true in the
same way as scientific claims, or claims in a scholarly work of history, or
everyday empirical claims about what is around us. For a fundamentalist of this
kind who happens to be Jewish or Christian, the story of Moses parting the Red
Sea is simply, ordinarily true in the sense that if you were able to travel back in
time with a video camera, you could record the event, return, and broadcast it on
the nightly news. Indeed, the most significant difference between journalism and
the Book of Exodus, in the eyes of the fundamentalist, is that the latter is more
reliably true, because God has guaranteed its accuracy. Religious
fundamentalism, in this sense, is defined by the denial of differences between the
kinds of claims made by religion and the kinds of claims made by science and
the practices and assumptions surrounding both.
The term "fundamentalism" has not always been a pejorative label
applied by secular rationalists to their religious opponents. It was developed by
Biblical literalist Protestants early in the twentieth century to refer to themselves.
They derived the label from the title of The Fundamentals:A Testimony to the
Truth, a series of paperbacks published between 1910 and 1915 that propounded
literalist Protestant views.17 Although The Fundamentalsattracted little attention

On fundamentalism in the United States, see generally GEORGE M. MARSDEN,
FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE (2d ed. 2006). For a broader but more polemical
16

introduction, see KAREN ARMSTRONG, THE BATTLE FOR GOD: A HISTORY OF FUNDAMENTALISM

(2001). Armstrong argues that most religious movements that have been called "fundamentalist"
arose as responses to the perceived threat of modernity:
[Fundamentalist] theologies and ideologies are rooted in fear. The desire to
define doctrines, erect barriers, establish borders, and segregate the faithful in
a sacred enclave where the law is stringently observed springs from that terror
of extinction which has made all fundamentalists, at one time or another,
believe that the secularists were about to wipe them out. The modern world,
which seems so exciting to a liberal, seems Godless, drained of meaning, and
even satanic to a fundamentalist.
Id. at 368; accord MALISE RUTHVEN, FUNDAMENTALISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 20 (2007)

(noting that fundamentalism "at its broadest . .. may be described as a religious way of being that
manifests itself in a strategy by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive
identities as individuals or groups in the face of modernity and secularization"). The most
comprehensive English-language collection of scholarly treatments of religious fundamentalism
can be found in the five volumes published by the Fundamentalism Project, culminating in 5
FUNDAMENTALISMS COMPREHENDED (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 2004).
17
See ARMSTRONG, supra note 16, at 171; MARSDEN, supra note 16, at 118-19 (describing the
origins of the term "fundamentalist"); RUTHVEN, supra note 16, at 21-22; see generally R. A.
TORREY, THE FUNDAMENTALS: A TESTIMONY TO THE TRUTH (R.A. Torrey et. al. eds., 2013).
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at the time of publication,' 8 the books provide a useful illustration of the
fundamentalist denial of distinctions between religious and scientific belief.
According to George Marsden, the author of a leading study of American
religious fundamentalism, "[t]he crucial issue" throughout The Fundamentals
was arguably "the authority of God in Scripture in relation to the authority of
modem science, particularly science in the form of higher criticism of Scripture
itself." 1 9 "Higher Criticism" was the attempt to apply "the new techniques of
literary analysis, archaeology, and comparative linguistics to the Bible,
subjecting it to a scientifically empirical methodology," with the inevitable result
that many Biblical tales were discovered to be "almost certainly not historical."20
One author of The Fundamentalsattempted to argue, for example, that a
truly scientific approach to the Bible demonstrated that Christianity was founded
on "historically proven fact." 2 1 "[T]rue science does not start with an a priori
hypothesis that certain things"-such as the miracles in the Bible-"are
impossible, but simply examines the evidence to find out what has actually
occurred." 2 2 Marsden refers to the authors of The Fundamentals as "champions
of science and rationality." 23 They framed their objections to scholarly criticisms
of the Bible's historical accuracy as defenses of true science and historical
criticism against its "illegitimate, unscientific and unhistorical use" by
speculative, "hypothesis-weaving . .. German theological professor[s]." 24
Ludwig Wittgenstein provides a helpful way of thinking about religious
belief in general and religious fundamentalism in particular in his Lectures on
Religious Belief ("the Lectures").25 In a manner characteristic of his later
philosophy,2 6 Wittgenstein avoids asserting a contestable theory of the nature of

I8

19

20

See ARMSTRONG, supra note 16, at 171; MARSDEN, supra note 16, at 119.
MARSDEN, supra note 16, at 120.

21

ARMSTRONG, supra note 16, at 95.
MARSDEN, supra note 16, at 121.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.at 120-21 (quoting R. A. TORREY, 1 THE FUNDAMENTALS: A TESTIMONY TO THE TRUTH

19 (R.A. Torrey et. al. eds., 2013)).
25

See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures on Religious Belief in LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS
ON AESTHETICS, PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF 53-72 (Cyril Barrett ed., 1966) [hereinafter
Wittgenstein, Lectures]. I note that the Lectures were not transcribed by Wittgenstein, but are
instead a posthumous collection of notes taken by his students during a course on belief offered
around 1938. See id. at vii. For convenience, I will refer to the Lectures throughout this Article as
though they accurately reflect Wittgenstein's views.
26
For an accessible introduction to the "therapeutic" understanding of Wittgenstein's later
philosophy adopted in this Article, see Robert J. Fogelin, Wittgenstein's Critique ofPhilosophy, in
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WITrGENSTEIN 34 (Hans Sluga & David G. Stem eds., 1996).

Fogelin's article introduces some of the central themes of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, partly
by emphasizing the importance of the logical imperfection (that is, indeterminacy,
underdetermination, and inconsistency) of the rules governing our use of terms in a natural
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religious belief in the Lectures. Instead, he offers a series of remarks that consist
mainly of hypothetical scenarios and tentative descriptions of various social and
linguistic practices, including responses we might have if asked to describe
various (often unusual) situations. The remarks are not controversial assertions
that Wittgenstein seeks to support and defend, but, as Wittgenstein writes
elsewhere, "reminders for a particular purpose.,

27

Wittgenstem rejects the notion

that philosophy should contain disputable theses or explanations, rather than
everyday descriptions with which everyone should presumably agree. 2 8
A few additional remarks about Wittgenstein's methods may provide
useful context for the Lectures. In general, if we take him at his word,
Wittgenstein's purpose in his later philosophy is therapeutic. 29 His aim is not to
offer a solution to any given philosophical problem, but to provide "a clear view

language. See generally id. Wittgenstein presents most philosophical problem-solving as
effectively trying to deny the extent of this logical imperfection, with interminable philosophical
dispute as a consequence. Cf LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 107
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS] ("For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation:
it was a requirement."). For more therapeutic accounts of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, see, for
example, GORDON BAKER, WITrGENSTEIN'S METHOD: NEGLECTED ASPECTS (2006); ROBERT J.
FOGELIN, TAKING WITTGENSTEIN AT His WORD: A TEXTUAL STUDY (2009); ROBERT J. FOGELIN,
WITTGENSTEIN 226-34 (2d ed. 1987) (noting similarities between the later Wittgenstein and
Pyrrhonian skepticism); Stanley Cavell, The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, in
MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY?: A BOOK OF ESSAYS 44 (2002). The varying interpretations
grouped together under the banner "the new Wittgenstein" also promote a generally therapeutic
approach. See THE NEW WITTGENSTEIN (Alice Crary & Rupert Read eds., 2000). For a more finegrained survey, see Hans-Johann Glock, Perspectives on Wittgenstein: An Intermittently
OpinionatedSurvey, in WITTGENSTEIN AND His INTERPRETERS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GORDON
BAKER 37, 52-60 (Guy Kahane et al. eds., 2009) (labeling what I have called "therapeutic"
approaches as "irrationalist," and limiting the label "therapeutic" to explicitly therapy-focused
works such as JOHN WISDOM, PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1953) and O.K. Bouwsma, The
Blue
Book,
58
J.
PHIL.
141
(1961),
https://sites.ualberta.ca/-francisp/NewPhil448/BouwsmaOnBlueBook61.pdf (reviewing LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS: PRELIMINARY STUDIES FOR THE 'PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS'
27

(1958))).

WITEGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 26,

§§

89, 127 ("We want to

understand something that is already in plain view," that is, "something that we need to remind
ourselves of.").
28
See id. § 109 ("We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its
place."); id. § 124 (stating that philosophy can "only describe" the use of language, and "leaves
everything as it is"); id. § 128 ("If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be
possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them."). When Wittgenstein refers to
"philosophy" in his methodological remarks in the Philosophical Investigations, he generally
means his therapeutic approach to philosophy, not the problem-solving approaches he critiques.
See generally id.
29
Cf id. § 133 ("There is not a philosophical method, although there are indeed methods, like
different therapies.").
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of the use of our words" 30 that will relieve the inquirer of the sense that there is
a deep philosophical problem that needs to be (or, indeed, can be) solved. 3' The
same applies to the Lectures, although they belong to an earlier, transitional
period in Wittgenstein's thought. Wittgenstein offers reminders of how we speak
about religious belief and expressions of that belief. One of his goals seems to be
the avoidance of philosophical confusions that might arise from the uncritical
adoption of misleading analogies between religious belief and scientific belief. 32
To borrow a term of art from Wittgenstein's later work, he wants to show
us how religious belief is part of a distinct "form of life," one that differs from
the form of life involved in scientific belief.3 3 He wants to shift our focus away
from the apparent similarities between the linguistic structures of expressions of
religious belief and assertions of scientific fact, and toward the dissimilarities
between the attitudes and practices that surround religious as opposed to
scientific beliefs. When we focus on the bare language of an expression of
religious belief, we may assume that the claim can only be understood as an
assertion of literal fact; when we expand our view to the way the expression is
used within a religious form of life, it may become unclear whether the,
expression is meant as a truth-claim at all, or even whether it makes sense to.
speak of the speaker as "believing" the claim in any ordinary sense.
For example, as Wittgenstein notes toward the start of the Lectures,
someone who does not believe in the Last Judgment does not necessarily
"believe the opposite" of someone who believes in the Last Judgment. 34 We do

30

Id.

§

122.

31
See id. § I11 ("[W]hy do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that is what the depth
of philosophy is.)"); id. § 133 ("It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the
use of our words in unheard-of ways.. . . The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of
stopping doing philosophy when I want to."); id. § 309 ("What is your aim in philosophy?-To
shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle."). Wittgenstein would deny that a philosophical problem
can be "solved," if this means discerning the structure of a logical "ideal" or logically "perfect
order" where no such perfection exists. See id. §§ 98-102, 107-19.
32
Cf id. § 90 (noting that philosophical problems may result from "[m]isunderstandings
concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms
of expression in different regions of language").
33
For the use of the critically contested term "Lebensform" ("form of life" or "life-form") in
PhilosophicalInvestigations, see, for example, id. § 241 ("It is what human beings say that is true
and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form

of life.").
34
Wittgenstein, Lectures, supra note 25, at 53. I note that although Wittgenstein chooses
belief in the future occurrence of the Last Judgment as the most frequently recurring example of

religious belief in the Lectures, his observations appear to be equally applicable to religious beliefs
concerning events in the past, such as belief in the (bodily) Resurrection of Jesus Christ.
Understood literally, the claim that the Last Judgment will occur, in all of its florid details
("[p]articles will rejoin in a thousand years") and the claim that the Resurrection did occur, conflict
equally with the norms of scientific belief. Id.
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not have a clear, well-established way of describing the difference between these
two beliefs, but Wittgenstein suggests that there is a difference in kind:
If you ask me whether or not I believe in a Judgement
Day, in the sense in which religious people have belief in it, I
wouldn't say: "No. I don't believe there will be such a thing." It
would seem to me utterly crazy to say this.
And then I give an explanation: "I don't believe in . .. ",

but then the religious person never believes what I describe.
I can't say. I can't contradict that person.
You might say: "Well, if you can't contradict him, that
means you don't understand him. If you did understand him,
then you might." That again is Greek to me. My normal
technique of language leaves me. I don't know whether to say
they understand one another or not.35
When a believer makes a statement about some religious subject matter,
it is tempting to treat the statement like an ordinary assertion of the statement's
truth. It is tempting to treat a profession of faith in Judgment Day, for example,
as a contestable assertion that the events described in the Book of Revelation will
one day take place. Such an assertion would be contradicted by a non-believer's
denial that Judgment Day will or could ever come.
Wittgenstein wants to raise the possibility, however, that the believer's
relation to the contents of her expression of faith may not be one of ordinary
belief at all. The believer's attitude toward the contents of her faith may be so
different from ordinary belief that it might be inaccurate to describe a nonbeliever's denial of the truth of the believer's statements as a "contradiction" of
those statements. Treating the believer's expression of faith as a factual assertion
may be to "miss[] the entire point" of what the believer said.36 Perhaps
Wittgenstein means to suggest that if the believer's profession of faith is seen as
a statement of a certain distinctly religious attitude or commitment, and not as an
ordinary, contestable, science-like truth-claim, then the non-believer's denial of
the truth of the believer's statements may not contradict the believer. The two
may instead be "talk[ing] past one another," as Hilary Putnam puts it: "[W]hen
the religious person says 'I believe there is a God' and the atheist says 'I don't
believe there is a God' they do not affirm and deny the same thing." 37
As support for the notion that religious belief might be a special kind of
belief, one that does not necessarily entail all that would be entailed by an
35

Wittgenstein, Lectures, supra note 25, at 55.

36

Id.

37

HILARY PUTNAM, RENEWING PHILOSOPHY 143 (2009) (discussing Wittgenstein, Lectures,

supra note 25).
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ordinary attitude of belief, Wittgenstein highlights those situations in which our
intuitions about how to describe religious beliefs and how to describe ordinary
beliefs diverge, as in the following passage:
Suppose somebody made this guidance for this life:
believing in the Last Judgement. Whenever he does anything,
this is before his mind. In a way, how are we to know whether
to say he believes this will happen or not?
Asking him is not enough. He will probably say he has
proof. But he has what you might call an unshakeable belief. It
will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for
belief, but rather by regulating ... all his life.
[Student:] Surely, he would say it is extremely wellestablished.
[Wittgenstein:] First, he may use "well-established" or
not use it at all. He will treat this belief as extremely wellestablished, and in another way as not well-established at all.38
The rules for correctly using terms like the verb "believe" and the
adjective "well-established" are relatively clear when we apply these terms to
run-of-the-mill empirical claims. But when we attempt to apply these terms (and
many others like them) to religious beliefs, the correct way of proceeding is often
much less clear. 39
Again, the divergence between the way we use the term "belief' in a
religious context and in a scientific one suggests that the attitude called "religious
belief' (or faith) may be significantly different from the ordinary attitude of
belief. This suspicion is strengthened by the differences between the way one
speaks of "belief in God" and the way one speaks of ordinary beliefs. For
example, believers routinely treat disbelief in God as "something bad," 40 while

38

Wittgenstein, Lectures, supra note 25, at 53-54.

39

In Wittgenstein's view, this kind of lack in clarity lies at the origin of many philosophical

problems.

See WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS,

supra note

26,

§

123 ("A

philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about."'). Where our agreed-upon rules
for the correct use of natural language terms runs out, yet we have a sense that there must be a
correct way of using the terms in this context-perhaps because we assume there must be a factof-the-matter about that which the terms describe, and we further assume that some way of using
the terms will "capture" or "correspond to" this state of affairs-we may be tempted to assert a
new rule in order to fill the gap and resolve our disquiet. Unfortunately, another philosopher may

assert a different, incompatible rule. If both of us view ourselves not as proposing new rules of
usage but simply as stating the way things are, a logically undecidable (and practically
interminable) dispute may result.
40
Wittgenstein, Lectures, supra note 25, at 59. Wittgenstein also hints at the idea that while

ordinary belief is often seen as a step down from knowing, almost like an opinion, "believing in
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normally this kind of moral judgment would not attach to the question of belief,
which is after all generally seen as largely nonvolitional-that is, largely out of
our control. 4
In the Lectures, Wittgenstein also addresses what I have called
"fundamentalism" (although he does not use that term), the insistence by a
believer that the contents of his faith are true in the same way and according to
the same standards as an accurate work of scientific or historical study:
In a religious discourse we use such expressions as: "I
believe that so and so will happen," and use them differently to
the way in which we use them in science.
Although, there is a great temptation to think we do.
Because we do talk of evidence, and do talk of evidence by
experience.
We could even talk of historic events.
It has been said that Christianity rests on an historic
basis.

42

Wittgenstein's representative fundamentalist is a certain "Father
O'Hara," who apparently delivered a series of talks on the BBC in 1930 arguing
for the scientific validity of various tenets of Christian faith.43 Wittgenstein
criticizes O'Hara for the denial of significant differences between the nature of
religious and scientific belief. "What seems to me ludicrous about O'Hara,"
Wittgenstein notes, "is his making it [i.e., religious belief] appear to be
reasonable."" He adds: "I would definitely call O'Hara unreasonable. I would
say, if this is religious belief, then it's all superstition .... Not only is it not
reasonable, but it doesn't pretend to be." 4 5
Wittgenstein's O'Hara denies that the evidence typically offered for the
truth of religious belief is of a different kind from scientific evidence. He ignores

God" has an entirely different status , one that seems if anything more solidly rooted than "belief
that . . ." something or other is ordinarily, factually the case. Id. at 60.
41
For discussions of some limited senses in which belief may be seen as volitional, see
Andrew Chignell, The Ethics of Belief, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 3 (Oct. 4,
2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-belief/ (collecting contemporary philosophical
positions).
42
Wittgenstein, Lectures, supra note 25, at 57.
43
See MIKEL BURLEY, CONTEMPLATING RELIGIOUS FORMS OF LIFE: WITTGENSTEIN AND D.Z.
PHILLIPS 62 n.17 (2012). Long before the Lectures, Wittgenstein was apparently already baffled
by attempts to import pre-modem religious practices directly into modernity, without recognizing
potential incongruities. Wittgenstein, Lectures, supra note 25, at 53. When Wittgenstein was
serving in the First World War, he "saw consecrated bread being carried in chromium steel. This
struck him as ludicrous." Id.
4
Wittgenstein, Lectures, supra note 25, at 58.
45
Id. at 58-59.
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that if you compare the typical evidence for religious beliefs "with anything in
Science which we call evidence," the former appears woefully inadequate.4 6 As
Wittgenstein puts it: "[Y]ou can't credit that anyone could soberly argue: 'Well,
I had this dream . . therefore . . Last Judgement."' 47 Evidence like this is so
inadequate as support for an ordinary, scientific belief that we should question
the temptation to say that the speaker has made an error: "You might say: 'For a
blunder, that's too big.' If you suddenly wrote numbers down on the blackboard,
and then said: 'Now, I'm going to add,' and then said: '2 and 21 is 13,' etc. I'd
say: 'This is no blunder."' 4 8 At some point, a departure from a set of norms
becomes so severe that we should question whether "error," "mistake," or
"blunder" are appropriate labels. It might instead be more accurate to describe
the behavior not as a violation of the norms we assume to be applicable, but as a
faithful adherence to a different set of norms. In the case of religious belief, the
kind of evidence offered in support of the belief ("Well, I had this dream. .
therefore . . . Last Judgement") is so vastly out of alignment with the believer's

attitude of unwavering confidence that we should question whether the
confidence is a mistake at all, or instead reflects a different attitude from ordinary
belief, one that appeals to or relies on a different set of norms. Indeed, if a belief
in a religious subject like the coming of Judgment Day could be based on
evidence, it would arguably cease to be a religious belief: "if there were evidence,
this would in fact destroy the whole business." 4 9
In sum, religious beliefs appear to belong to a different form of life from
evaluation according to scientific evidentiary norms. The difference lies not so
much in the subject matter of the beliefs as in the different behaviors and attitudes
surrounding the beliefs, which we could identify even in an unfamiliar culture,
as anthropologists:
We come to an island and we find beliefs there, and
certain beliefs we are inclined to call religious....

46

Id. at 61.

47

Id.
Id. at 61-62.

48

49
Id. at 56; Cf IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 117 (Paul Guyer & Allen W.
Wood eds. & trans., 1998) ("Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.").
O.K. Bouwsma, a Christian philosopher who spent time with and was deeply influenced by
Wittgenstein, explores the incompatability of faith and evidence at length in O.K. Bouwsma, Faith,
Evidence, and Proof in WITHOUT PROOF OR EVIDENCE 1, 17-25 (J.L. Craft & Ronald E. Hustwit
eds., 1984) ("It is said that oil and water do not mix. And so it is with evidence and faith."). I note
that Bouwsma also detects the underlying connection between atheists and fundamentalists, who
share "the disposition to regard all uses of language as the same . .. [and] regard all language as
serving 'to convey thoughts."' Id. at 19.
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These statements would not just differ in respect to what
they are about. Entirely different connections would make them
into religious beliefs . .
To approach religious beliefs as though they were merely scientific
beliefs concerning religious matters-as the fundamentalist does in defending
his belief, and as the atheist does in criticizing it5 '-may involve a
misunderstanding of what religious beliefs are. The denial of differences
between religious and scientific beliefs assumes that religious beliefs should rest
on scientific proof, when in fact, any belief resting on such proof would, at least
arguably, by definition, no longer be a religious belief. It is perhaps because of
the profound differences between religious and scientific beliefs that the English
language has developed a special term for the former: faith.52
B. Legal Discourse:Descriptive and PrescriptiveAspects

Wittgenstein, so far as I am aware, never performed an investigation of
legal discourse analogous to his investigation of religious belief in the Lectures.
If Wittgenstein left behind very little upon which to build a philosophy of
religion, he apparently left behind nothing specific upon which to build a
philosophy of law.53

Wittgenstein, Lectures, supra note 25, at 58.
5'
In his authoritative biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk notes:
Both the atheist, who scorns religion because he has found no evidence for its
tenets, and the believer, who attempts to prove the existence of God, have
fallen victim to . . . the idol-worship of the scientific style of thinking.
Religious beliefs are not analogous to scientific theories, and should not be
accepted or rejected using the same evidential criteria.
RAY MONK, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: THE DUTY OF GENIUS 410 (1991).
52
Cf Wittgenstein, Lectures, supra note 25, at 57 (noting the use of special words such as
"faith" and "dogma" to refer to religious beliefs). I note that in German, there is only a single word
for "faith" and "belief," der Glaube. Wittgenstein appears to have delivered the Lectures in English
at Cambridge, and for the most part he is recorded as using the word "belief' rather than "faith."
s3
Most previous efforts to bring the later philosophy of Wittgenstein into dialogue with legal
theory have been attempts to draw conclusions about the nature of legal reasoning and
interpretation from Wittgenstein's often misunderstood remarks about rule-following. See, e.g., H.
L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 297 n.125 (2d ed. 1994); Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Breaking
the Rules?: Wittgenstein andLegalRealism, 107 YALE L.J. 1853, 1853 nn.2 & 4 (1998) (collecting
sources); Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction
of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1, 3 n.13 (1993) (drawing on P.M.S. Hacker's non-therapeutic
reading of Wittgenstein as basis for criticizing emphasis on interpretation among legal theorists).
Previous attempts to bring Wittgenstein's therapeuticmethods into dialogue with problems in legal
and constitutional theory have not, to my knowledge, drawn on the Lectures or focused on the
descriptive-prescriptive ambiguity of legal discourse. See, e.g., PHILIP BoaBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1991) (defining legitimate constitutional argument in terms of six modalities of
argument accepted by the legal culture). Bobbitt "mak[es] the basically Wittgensteinian point that
5o
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Nevertheless, Wittgenstein's approach to religious belief in the Lectures
provides a model for a novel approach to understanding legal discourse. We have
seen that the surface resemblances between expressions of religious belief and
assertions of scientific fact can mislead us into concluding that the former must
be viewed as scientific claims about religious subjects. Similarly, this Section
will suggest that the superficial resemblances between statements of the law
made by legal actors and statements about the law made by, for example,
sociologists, historians, or political scientists can lead us to overlook the
distinctive features of legal discourse. Just as viewing a religious person's
expression of faith in isolation might lead to the mistaken conclusion that the
person must believe her religious views are supported by ordinary empirical
evidence, so viewing a judge's or attorney's statement of the law in isolation
might lead to the mistaken conclusion that the statement can only be understood
as purely descriptive-as a statement of what the law is divorced from any
consideration of what the law should be.
Closer inspection of the practices of judges and attorneys suggests,
however, that statements of the law by legal actors can be seen as belonging to a
"language game" (to adopt another Wittgensteinian term of art) in which
description and prescription are inextricably interwoven. An outsider opposed to
the distinctive norms that govern legal discourse is free to dismiss this blending
of description and prescription as invalid in some sense-as a confusion or
charade, or perhaps as a kind of purely instrumental use of language as
performance, detached from any question of belief. The perspective of this
critical outside observer (the legal "atheist") will be discussed below. But just as
Wittgenstein showed that the religious atheist's view of religious belief is not the
only one that can be defended in neutral terms-that is, terms that are available
to believers and non-believers alike-so the view of legal discourse introduced
here attempts to show that the critical outsider's view of legal discourse is not
the only one available both to committed legal practitioners and to disinterested
observers of the law.
In order to illustrate the distinctive blending of the descriptive and the
prescriptive that characterizes legal discourse, it may be useful to begin-in the
spirit of Wittgenstein-by considering some hypothetical examples and how we
would tend to describe them.

the ground of legal discourse must rest in the practice of legal discourse itself, rather than in some
other feature of the world." Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalGrammar, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 1771, 1777 (1994); accord Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional Theory, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1842-43 (1994) (noting that "[a]lthough Wittgenstein rarely appears explicitly
in Bobbitt's work, it has always been clear to philosophically inclined readers that Bobbitt's project
is in considerable sympathy with Wittgenstein's"). In any case, "taking a therapeutic
Wittgensteinian approach" to a topic or problem is not a predictable, algorithmic process, and this
Article does not claim to present the only valid or useful way that Wittgenstein's therapeutic
methods might be brought to bear on problems of legal or constitutional theory.
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Imagine that a client enters his attorney's office and complains that the
city violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment by refusing to
post his anti-war ad on the sides of a city bus. After the attorney researches the
case law and relevant municipal regulations, it turns out that the specific
circumstances of the client's case fall into a gray area. No precedents are entirely
on point. Some persuasive authorities suggest that the city violated the client's
rights, while others suggest that the city did not.
Let us assume that when the attorney meets again with her client, the
attorney does her best to describe the current state of the law in all of its
uncertainty and lack of clarity. The attorney tells the client not what either of
them wishes the law to be, but simply what the attorney believes the law is. In
the course of informing the client about the state of the law, she says things like:
"The First Amendment does not allow. . ." and "According to the Supreme
Court, the city can probably. . . ." The attorney might also frame some of her
statements of the law as statements about the likelihood of a judge ruling one
thing or another. We might say that the attorney's statements at this meeting are
purely "descriptive" statements about the contents of the law, about what the law
is, not "prescriptive" statements about what the law should be.54
Now suppose that the client decides to try his luck by filing a lawsuit
seeking an injunction against the city. In appearances before the court, and during
negotiations with the city's attorneys, the attorney makes claims that, viewed in
isolation, appear structurally (that is, if we look only at the form or syntax of the
sentences) indistinguishable from the claims the attorney made in private to her
client. She continues to say things like: "The First Amendment does not
allow. . . ."But something has changed. The claims are no longer the same ones
that the attorney made to the client behind closed doors. Where the attorney had
privately advised that courts disagree about whether the First Amendment allows

54
Throughout this Article, I will generally refer to reasoning about what is as "descriptive"
reasoning, and reasoning about what should be or ought to be as "prescriptive" reasoning. I use the
distinction between "descriptive" and "prescriptive" rather than the more common and somewhat
similar distinction between "positive" and "normative" for two reasons. First, I wish to avoid
confusions that might arise concerning the relation between my arguments about the nature of legal
discourse and related but conceptually distinct debates in legal theory regarding "positivism" (in
the sense of the school of legal philosophy), or the "normative" aspect of law (in the sense of
obligations that law ostensibly imposes on us). Second, I wish to avoid confusions that might result
from uses of the term "normative" (and related terms) to refer to aspects of constitutional
interpretation that are not the focus of this Article. For example, many theorists and adjudicators
would concede that "norms" have a valid role to play in constitutional interpretation-especially
if this means only that there are values of some kind that are somehow implicit in the
Constitution-but would insist that these norms exist apart from whatever a legal interpreter might
wish to be the case. This Article's concern is different. This Article is concerned with the role of
an interpreter'sviews of what the Constitution should mean (her prescriptive preferences) in her
stated legal conclusions about what the Constitution does mean. As we will see, the theorists and
adjudicators discussed below almost uniformly deny that a legal interpreter's personal prescriptive
preferences have any valid role to play in her descriptive conclusions.
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a city to behave as it did in the client's case, and cautioned the client that victory
was uncertain, the attorney now proclaims that all relevant legal authorities are
overwhelmingly on the side of her client and that any cases appearing to reach a
different conclusion are distinguishable, poorly reasoned, not binding on the
present court, or all of the above.
How should we understand the attorney's statements of the law in her
role as advocate, rather than counselor or researcher?
On the one hand, the attorney's statements as advocate present
themselves as purely descriptive. The attorney phrases the statements as a
description of what the law is, not what the attorney wishes the law were.
Perhaps, then, we should say that the statements are what they appear to be: they
are descriptions of the law. They may be partially inaccurate, to the extent that
they reflect strategic rhetoric or even wishful thinking on the part of the attorney,
but they remain inaccurate descriptions,not prescriptionsof what the law ought
to be.
On the other hand, it is clear that the attorney's statements of the law
during negotiations and in court are not disinterested predictions of what the
judge will say if called upon to reach a legal conclusion. Everyone involved
recognizes this. The attorney's statements are unabashedly slanted and biased
advocacy for what the attorney believes the judge should say in ruling for her
client. In that sense, we might be tempted to say that the attorney's statements
are simply prescriptive claims: the attorney is implicitly saying what she believes
the law should be.
Are the attorney's claims as advocate (partially inaccurate) descriptions
of what the law is? Or are they (dishonestly phrased) prescriptions for what the
law should be? Or something else?
Before answering, we might consider other things that it would not be
unusual for the attorney to say. She might transition from a description of what
the First Amendment requires to a request that the judge hold that the First
Amendment requires what she has said it requires. A statement like "Your
Honor, the First Amendment requires. . ." might be followed by a concluding
statement like "Your Honor, this court should hold that the First Amendment
requires . . . ." The latter statement might suggest to us that the former statement,
despite its descriptive appearance, was a prescriptive statement all along.
Similarly, we can imagine the attorney, during the course of her
argument, transitioning more or less seamlessly from the claim that the legal
sources require the court to rule for her client, to the claim that the consequences
of ruling for her client will be beneficial for society, or that ruling against her
client would be a grave injustice. If the attorney's statements of the law are
merely descriptive, as they appear to be based on their phrasing, then what
relevance could there be to these arguments concerming policy consequences and
principles like fairness or justice? At least at first glance, reasoning based on
policy and principle seems relevant to a determination of what the law should be,
not to a determination of what the law is-unless we assume that the law in
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question invites a consideration of policy consequences and fairness, which is
rarely something that attorneys argue under the circumstances of our
hypothetical (that is, where the law itself contains no explicit guidance that courts
should consider policy consequences or "equity").
The attorney's behavior is so familiar, so routine in our adversarial legal
system, that we might be tempted to gloss over its strangeness and assume that
we all know exactly what is going on. We might be tempted to say the attorney
is simply being an advocate. She is paid to articulate the most advantageous yet
plausible understanding of the law for her client, partly in the hope that the judge
will echo this understanding of the law when it comes time to make a legal ruling.
She might sometimes persuade herself that what she is saying is true, but this is
not an essential part of her performance.
Yet the familiarity of legal advocacy in our world may blind us to how
unusual it is. Where outside of the law do we find professionals vehemently
asserting the reality of their wishes, presenting desired outcomes as already
obtained, and requesting action by asserting that the action has already taken
place? It is not ordinarily valid to infer from the fact that something should be
the case to the conclusion that it is. Where outside of legal forms of life do we
find adults (rather than children) arguing that something factually is the case,
because it would be unfair if it were not the case?
As suggested above, perhaps we can understand the attorney's
arguments concerning policy and principle as implicitly saying: what the law is,
is determined by what the creators of the law intended it to be, and the creators
of the law surely did not intend the negative consequences I am describing. But
as already noted, this does not seem quite right, at least in most cases, because
the attorney does not usually connect her fairness or consequentialist arguments
to evidence concerning anyone's or any institution's intentions. Rather, in most
cases, the injustice or negative consequences are apparently offered as reasons
in and of themselves to reject an opponent's proposed understanding of the law.
The lawyers appear to be openly engaged in advocating for adopting different
understandings of the law because of the consequences those understandings
would have.
Alternately, perhaps we could understand the attorney's arguments
regarding policy and principle as implicitly saying: the law is not clear on this
point-or we might even say that the law does not yet exist on this point-and it
is up to you as the judge to define the law by making a decision in this case. Here
are some reasons why you should adopt my proposed statement of what the law
is and reject my opponent's.. . . This would suggest that the attorney's
ostensibly descriptive statements may in fact have been, all along, prescriptive
statements sotto voce of what the law should be.
And yet we would not say that the attorney is merely stating what she
believes the law should be. There might be any number of differences between
what the attorney would wish the law to be, if she could rewrite it from scratch,
and how she presents the law in court. To the extent that the attorney's statements
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of the law are prescriptive rather than purely descriptive, they are prescriptions
within fairly tight constraints. In general, the attorney will only offer legal
prescriptions that she believes the judge, or a judge somewhere along the line,
might adopt.
So, which is it? Are the attorney's statements of the law descriptions of
what the law is or prescriptions for what the law should be? Our linguistic
intuitions lead us in conflicting directions. This is most likely because the rules
governing the correct use of the terms "descriptive" and "prescriptive" do not
extend in any clear way to descriptions of the kinds of statements of the law made
by actors in the legal system-what might be called legal statements, as opposed
to scholarly historical or sociological statements. The accepted practice of legal
actors in making statements of the law is to blend description and prescription
without clearly distinguishing the two. This is how the language game of making
legal statements of the law is played.
The phenomenon is not limited to attorney-advocates. Judges'
statements of the law blend description and prescription as well, although not in
precisely the same ways as attorneys' statements. Perhaps the most significant
difference between legal statements of the law by judges and those by attorneys
is the performative aspect of the former. If the judge in our hypothetical case
rules that the city is prohibited by law from rejecting the client's ad, then we
might say that by virtue of the judge's statement the city is prohibited by law
from rejecting the client's ad. The judge's statement is similar to that of an
official who christens a ship by stating, in the appropriate context, "I name this
ship the Queen Elizabeth." 55 We might say that the official's statement becomes
true by virtue ofhis having spoken it as he did. In light of the performative aspect
of judicial decisions, we might be tempted to conclude that judges' statements of
the law (unlike statements by attorneys) are "purely descriptive" in the sense that

5
The example comes from J. L. Austin's analysis of performatives in J. L. AUSTIN, How To
Do THINGS WITH WORDS 5 (2d ed. 1975). Strangely, to me at least, Austin insists that performatives
such as the one in this example are neither true nor false. See id. He views performatives as
linguistic acts that do not make factual claims, rather than as linguistic acts that make selfreferential factual claims that are true when the performative is successfully carried out. I suppose
nothing stops us from following Austin's lead. But it is typical of how philosophical disputes arise
in contemporary philosophy that Austin presents his way of talking about performatives not as a
logically arbitrary choice, undertaken for some practical reason, but simply as the correct way of
using the terms involved.

Incidentally, Austin himself seems to have recognized that statements of the law by appropriate
legal authorities can be seen as performatives. See id. at 4 n.2 ("Of all people, jurists should be best
aware" that performatives are not statements of fact, "[y]et they will succumb to their own timorous
fiction, that a statement of 'the law' is a statement of fact."). I note that Austin is not suggesting
here that statements of the law are not purely "factual" in the sense that they routinely contain a

blend of the descriptive ("factual") and the prescriptive, as this Article argues. Rather, Austin's
point seems to be that statements of the law are not "factual" because they are performative, and

performatives (according to his way of talking about performatives, as described above) do not
state facts.
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the judge's statement is almost by definition an accurate description of what the
law is-at least the law of the case, at least for the time being.
But this is not quite right. To the extent that the judge's statement of the
law performatively establishes what the law is, we would probably not refer to
the statement as a "description" at all. It would be odd to describe the holding in
an opinion as an accurate description ofitself We would more likely say, simply,
"The judge held . . ." or "The judge's decision establishes that. .
More importantly, we do not always speak of ajudge's statements of law
as performatively defining what the law is. We tend to recognize that judges can
err in their statements of the law. If the judge in our hypothetical case states that
the sides of city buses are a traditional public forum under the First Amendment,
we would say that the judge's statement is inaccurate. Even when we agree with
a judge's legal analysis, it would be odd to say that the First Amendment requires
something because the judge said the First Amendment required it. We might
say this in the context of Supreme Court decisions, if we accept the Supreme
Court as the arbiter of the meaning of the First Amendment. But we do not always
speak even of Supreme Court decisions as though they are correct by definition.
Even the Supreme Court sometimes refers to its past decisions as wrong. 56
To the extent that we are willing to say a judge's statement of the law
may be wrong, the judge's statements can be seen as displaying much of the same
descriptive-prescriptive ambiguity as the attorney's statements discussed above.
From a Wittgensteinian perspective, the judge operates, like the attorney, in a
landscape of logically imperfect legal rules, with no signpost indicating the
points at which various forms of constraint give way to various forms of
discretion." Yet judges must make decisions, just as attorneys must zealously

56
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) ("[W]e think
Plessy was wrong the day it was decided .... .").
5
Some legal theorists might wish to interject at this point that although the rules embodied in
some limited set of written legal materials may be logically imperfect and thus provide inadequate
resources for arriving at a single correct answer to a legal question, the law as a whole (correctly
understood) supplements these legal materials with other resources, including but not limited to
implicit policies and principles, that make it possible for an ideal interpreter to determine the single
correct answer to any legal question, no matter how hard the case. This Article does not attempt to
develop and defend a Wittgensteinian approach to legal theory in general and to distinguish such
an approach from the leading alternatives. Instead, it is assumed that the logical imperfection of
the law as a whole often results in hard legal questions with no single deductively correct answer.
I also note that it is unnecessary for this Article to take a position on when and how often, precisely,
the law "runs out" in the sense that the relevant legal materials, interpreted in accordance with
professional norms, leave room for judges of differing ideological preferences to reach differing
legal conclusions through motivated reasoning based on those preferences. All that is necessary
for this Article's argument is that the reader agree that such situations are, sometimes, felt to arise,
and that they do so frequently enough in constitutional interpretation to merit our attention. The
latter claim seems difficult to deny in light of the predictable ideological disagreements in
constitutional interpretation even among competent professionals. To attempt to determine
precisely, universally, and objectively where the law runs out would require imposing logical
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advocate for their clients. Where an analysis of what the law is does not decide
an issue because the clarity of the accepted legal rules has "run out," judges are
forced to reach decisions about what the law, in some sense, should be.58
Thus, to the extent that the legal rules governing a case are logically
imperfect-to the extent that the determinacy of the law runs out before resolving
every material legal issue in a case-judicial statements of the law have a
prescriptive aspect no less than the statements of the law offered by attorneyadvocates. Both judges and attorneys habitually offer statements of the law that
are phrased as descriptions of what the law is but in fact reflect prescriptive views
regarding what the speaker believes the law should be. This is how legal
discourse works. To intermingle description and prescription in a legal statement
of the law, without clearly distinguishing the two, is not a violation of the rules
of the judicial or legal-advocacy game. It is to adhere to the pervasive and
longstanding if tacit norms of our legal form of life.59
perfection on a logically imperfect system-without any practical goals to guide our otherwise
arbitrary creation of rules. Rather than inviting interminable philosophical dispute by asserting.
such rules, the therapeutic Wittgensteinian approach would be to offer clarifying observations
about when we might say the law runs out, in the hope of relieving the interlocutor's (or our own)
sense that a correct abstract answer must exist.
58
The only alternatives would be for a judge (perversely) to fill the uncertainty in the law with
what he believes the law should not be, or (arbitrarily) to choose a method of decision that will
generate outcomes with a purely random relation to what he believes the law should or should not
be. But even these approaches would in another sense result in the judge reaching a decision based
on what he believes the law should be. The outcome is still determined by the judge's view of what
should determine the outcome; the judge has only displaced his lower-level preferences with a
higher-level preference to avoid acting based on the lower-level preferences. Where the factual
"is" of law ceases to provide sufficient guidance, and the judge is nevertheless forced to make a
decision, it appears the judge has no choice but to act based on his own normative "ought," at some
level.
5
Paul Kahn offers a perceptive if enigmatic description of what I have referred to as the
intermingling of description and prescription in legal discourse:
Together, reason and will operate always to make possible either an
affirmation of the status quo or an effort of legal reform. Both are possible
moves within the articulation of what the law is. In fact, we constantly make
both moves at once: we affirm the current law and seek its reform. What the
law is is inseparable from what the law should be.
PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 15 (1999).

Richard Fallon has also argued for a view of legal discourse as a social practice defined in part by
the blending of descriptive and prescriptive reasoning. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
ConstructivistCoherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1235
(1987) ("[T]he blurring of the distinction between 'is' and 'ought' is not methodological confusion
but a phenomenon already embedded in our constitutional practice . . . ."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Constitutional Constraints,97 CAL. L. REV. 975, 980 n.31 (2009) ("[A] tacitly recognized rule of
constitutional practice, grounded in acceptance . . . confers upon judges and justices a power to
make determinations of what would be legally 'best' in a sense that depends partly on moral or
policy judgments."). Although Fallon presents his views as descended from the theories of Ronald
Dworkin, he avoids what I see as Dworkin's Platonism by focusing on the description and
evaluation of social practices rather than offering claims about, for example, the ethereal existence
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C. Legal Fundamentalismand Legal Atheism
The religious fundamentalist, according to the description offered above,
denies that there are significant differences between the nature of religious
beliefs and the nature of ordinary empirical or scientific beliefs. The
fundamentalist ignores the peculiarities of faith: the unshakeable conviction, the
way that the belief is bound up with an identity-defining commitment rather than
being contingent on ordinary kinds of evidence. Instead, the fundamentalist
insists that his religious claims are literally true and are defensible in just the
same way as the conclusions from a work of scientific research.
By analogy, we can conceive of a legal fundamentalist as someone who
denies that there are significant differences between his statements of what the
law is and, say, statements about judicial behavior made by political scientists or
historians. 60 The legal fundamentalist insists that when he engages in legal

of correct answers to all legal questions. This Article can be seen as an attempt to address the
tension between Fallon's suggestion that the blurring of "is" and "ought" is a "tacitly recognized
rule of constitutional practice" and the fact that when judges, legal scholars, and the public speak
explicitly about constitutional practice, they tend to vehemently deny that such blurring is at all
acceptable and to insist that a judge's personal values and preferences should play no role in
constitutional adjudication.
I also note that it might be tempting to conclude based on the translated title Of JORGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., 1996), that Habermas shares this Article's view
of legal discourse as properly constituted in part by the blending of descriptive and prescriptive
reasoning. Assuming that Habermas's arguments apply to American legal practice at all, however,
he does not endorse this position. Rather, he agrees with Dworkin that all proper legal statements
should be purely descriptive, and that the prescriptive appearance of legal discourse is either
improper or reflects judges' discernment of moral or political values that are already latent within

the law. See id. at 224-25 (suggesting that one may suspect judges who adhere to Dworkin's theory
of adjudication of improperly making decisions based on political ideology, while Habermas's own
theory "remove[s] the suspicion of ideology" by grounding the procedural principles ofjudging in
a dialogical theory of legal argumentation); Wesley Shih, Reconstruction Blues: A Critique of
Habermasian Adjudicatory Theory, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 331, 347 (2003) (noting that

"Habermas refuses to permit judges to make decisions from material outside of the law, including
political ideology," because discretionary judicial decision making "jeopardizes Habermas's
concept of strict legal neutrality"). Habermas's title in the original German, "Faktizitdt und
Geltung" ("facticity and validity"), refers not to the descriptive-prescriptive aspects of legal
discourse described in this Article but to the fact that a legal system, in his view, must at the same
time offer factual certainty about what the law is ("established law guarantees the enforcement of
legally expected behavior and therewith the certainty of law") and ensure the normative validity of
the law ("rational procedures for making and applying law promise to legitimate the expectations
that are stabilized in this way; the norms deserve legal obedience"). HABERMAS, supra note 59, at
198. A "tension" exists between determinate facticity and normative validity, and modern law
displays this tension in its "pure form." Id. at 152.
6
Consider the psychologist Jonathan Haidt's analogy for the role of motivated reasoning in
moral judgment: "The reasoning process is more like a lawyer defending a client than a judge or
scientist seeking truth." Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
IntuitionistApproach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCH. REv. 814, 820 (2001). The assumption is

that lawyer-advocates do not purely seek the truth, while judges, like scientists, do. Haidt's analogy
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discourse, his statements of the law are not materially influenced by what he
might wish the law to be. His legal statements are simply accurate descriptions
of the contents of the law. In reality, of course, the legal fundamentalist's
conclusions rest on the combination of descriptive and prescriptive reasoning
that characterizes legal discourse, but the legal fundamentalist denies that this is
the case.
The legal fundamentalist holds the statements of the law made by other
legal actors to the same purely descriptive standards that he believes his
statements satisfy. When a judge states that the law is one thing, while in fact the
law is open to dispute on this point, and the judge's claim reflects in part what
she believes the law should be, the legal fundamentalist will likely think it fair to
criticize the judge's statement as inaccurate and biased-a product of mistake,
self-delusion, or dishonesty. The legal fundamentalist assumes that judges
should offer nothing but honest, accurate descriptions of the law, entirely
uninfluenced by the judge's prescriptive preferences. The legal fundamentalist
may acknowledge that it is socially justifiable for attorneys in our adversarial,
role-based system to bend their presentations of the law in their clients' favors,
but an air of disrepute lingers around even this practice.
This is a deliberately extreme portrait of the legal fundamentalist. In
practice, it is hard to imagine an attorney-for-hire adopting a consistent
fundamentalist attitude toward all of her statements of the law. Even a judge
would have to be powerfully adept at self-delusion to believe that all of her
statements of the law were entirely uninfluenced by her view of what the law
should be.
But while a pure legal fundamentalist may be hard to find, pure legal
fundamentalism is not. We often find legal actors adopting a straightforwardly
fundamentalist attitude toward one or another statement of the law that they have
made or are making. "Legal fundamentalism" is a useful explanatory concept
because legal fundamentalism is a pervasive phenomenon of our legal culture;
its pervasiveness can be found in the frequency with which individual legal
actors adopt a legal fundamentalist stance toward individual legal statements.
We can also conceive of legal "atheism" as an attitude toward the
blending of description and prescription in legal discourse. An atheist in religious
matters is typically someone who agrees with religious fundamentalists that
religious claims must stand or fall based on ordinary empirical evidence, but who
believes (unlike the fundamentalist) that there is no religious tradition whose
beliefs succeed according to this standard. Similarly, we can define legal atheism
as agreement with the legal fundamentalist that legal conclusions are simply
descriptive claims about what the law is, accompanied by the further belief that
in virtually every dispute between professionally competent legal
fundamentalists, both sides are wrong. The descriptive accuracy that the legal

is also useful as an illustration of the fact that legal fundamentalism remains the default
understanding of the law among non-lawyers.
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fundamentalist claims is rarely possible, at least in the interesting cases that tend
to be the focus of dispute, because the law frequently fails to provide clear
guidance about how a case should be decided. The legal atheist believes that
more or less all attorneys and judges routinely articulate new rules where they
claim merely to speak in accordance with existing rules. They make law based
on their views about what the law should be but inaccurately claim merely to
have found what the law is. The legal atheist accepts the fundamentalist's
demand for descriptive accuracy and honesty, but lacks the faith of the
fundamentalist in the God of formal reasoning, the guarantor of the law's
completeness and determinacy.
Arguably the purest expression of legal atheism, in the sense above, can
be found in Joseph Singer's The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory. 6 1After providing a classic account of why "neither the theories proposed
See Joseph William Singer, The Playerand the Cards:Nihilism andLegal Theory, 94 YALE
L.J. 1 (1984). The Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement in general could be seen as
representative of legal atheism in spirit and tone if not always in precise substance. Pierre Schlag,
for example, echoes the legal atheist's objection to the pervasive role of unacknowledged
prescriptive premises in legal reasoning. Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other
Means, 85 CAL. L. REv. 427 (1997). He criticizes "a certain form of reasoning very popular in
American jurisprudence. This is the kind of reasoning through which the legal thinker attempts to
establish the existence of something fervently desired." Id. at 427. Drawing on the rhetoric of
religious atheism, Schlag criticizes this form of reasoning as "covertly theological" and "magical
thinking." Id. at 428, 437. He concludes that
short of dissonance or bad faith (both of which are certainly possible) there is
no intellectually respectable way to [continue doing law]. It is no more possible
to continue doing law in an intellectually respectable way once the metaphysic
is gone, than to continue [to] worship once God is dead.
Id. at 440. One of the central goals of this Article is to raise the possibility that there may be a way
to "believe in law" and the Constitution that neither denies the indeterminacy of legal methods
highlighted by CLS, nor descends into "dissonance or bad faith." Id. at 428, 440.
To take another example from CLS, Duncan Kennedy has recently grappled with many of the
same features of contemporary legal scholarship and adjudication addressed in this Article. See
Duncan Kennedy, The Hermeneutics of Suspicion in ContemporaryAmerican Legal Thought, 25
LAW & CRITIQUE 91, 91 (2014) [hereinafter Kennedy, The Hermeneutics of Suspicion] (arguing
that elite jurists engage in a "hermeneutics of suspicion" by "work[ing] to uncover hidden
ideological motives behind the 'wrong' legal arguments of their opponents, while affirming their
own right answers allegedly innocent of ideology"). Rather than appealing primarily to religious
faith as an explanatory frame, as this Article does, Kennedy's article emphasizes Freud's writings
concerning sexual jealousy. See id. at 124-25 (discussing jurists' hermeneutics of suspicion as
rooted in "projective identification," that is, "projecting something in oneself, something one feels
is bad or conflict-producing, onto others, and then vigorously condemning it in them"); id. at 136
("[W]hile the mainstream accepts that value judgments are inescapable, it also views ideologically
driven legal error as transgression and sees it everywhere.").
61

Even more recently, Kennedy has explicitly argued that "it is permissible for the judge to write
and speak in bad faith," that is, "consciously and deliberately cast[ing] his argument . . . in the
seriously misleading rhetoric of legal necessity," "but only so long as he honestly believes it is (a)
necessary to prevent serious bad consequences for the body politic (b) taking into account the
negative consequences." Duncan Kennedy, Proportionalityand 'Deference' in Contemporary
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by the [legal] theorists, nor the arguments used by the judges to justify their
decisions, nor the legal rules in force are as determinate as traditional theorists
and judges claim." 6 2 Singer concludes:
It is understandable that the more controversial and politicized
the decision, the more a court will want to appear above
controversy. Such false appeals to neutrality are, nonetheless,
illegitimate. When judges write opinions justifying their
disposition of cases and their choices of rule, they should feel
free honestly to express what they really were thinking about
when they decided the case. These revelations will clarify the
moral and political views at stake in legal controversies. Judges
should also explicitly discuss the social context surrounding the
legal dispute.

Constitutional Thought 38-44

(Harv.

Pub.

Law,

Working

Paper

No.

17-09,

2017),

https://papers.ssm.com/abstractid=2931220. Although Kennedy correctly notes that his ultimate
acceptance in some cases of the permissibility of bad faith formalist judicial rhetoric puts him in
tension with other CLS-affiliated scholars such as Karl Klare, from the perspective of this Article
his approach remains aligned with CLS in its underlying atheistic assumptions. See id. at 39.
Kennedy assumes that the self-conscious omission of prescriptive, inevitably ideologically
inflected premises from a judge's legal conclusions must constitute bad faith and "dishonesty,"

and thus requires some ethical justification. Id. at 40. The Wittgensteinian perspective of this
Article, by contrast, suggests that such omission is simply a well-established aspect of the settled

social practice of legal discourse, and need raise no ethical qualms. In fact, we might wonder
whether a legal system based on "honesty" in Kennedy's sense would even be feasible. If a judge
were in every decision in every case ethically obligated to spell out precisely where and how he
believed the cited legal materials became uncertain, and then to attempt to specify precisely and
completely which considerations beyond those materials influenced his judgment, not only might
the process of attempted confession create its own fog of confusion and doubt (where would the

phenomenological self-analysis end, especially with regard to obscure, half-perceived inclinations
and biases?), but the result would probably be unrecognizable as a judicial opinion. Surely honesty
and good faith do not require that legal opinions become something else entirely, such as laborious

exercises in publicly displayed introspection.
Finally, I note that Kennedy has described himself as a constitutional atheist, but in a different
sense than the one in this Article. See Duncan Kennedy, American ConstitutionalismAs Civil
Religion: Notes ofan Atheist, 19 NOVA L. REV. 909 (1995). He defines constitutional atheism as
"the conviction that there is no human collectivity, The People, that authors and consents to
constitutional law as laid down by the Supreme Court." Id. at 917. He contrasts his atheism with

the views of those who "seem to believe it is meaningful to talk about, and to identify with a transtemporal mythic People, so that they feel that the text of the Constitution is an emanation of a
totality in which they participate in a way that somehow simultaneously binds and ennobles them."
Id. at 916. I note that Kennedy also refers to "[c]onstitutional fundamentalism," which he associates

generally with "belief in the People or in Original Intent." Id. at 916.
62

Singer, supra note 61, at 14.

63

Id. at 32. An earlier although less explicit plea for honesty in the statement of legal

conclusions can be found in Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach,

35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 841-42 (1935) (proposing, among other things, that judges "not fool
[themselves]" by purporting to base their decisions on neutral logical deductions, but instead
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By calling for judicial honesty, Singer suggests that there is something
dishonest about the way that judicial opinions and, for that matter, works of legal
scholarship are ordinarily presented. But is honesty, in this sense, an appropriate
criterion to apply to a legal conclusion? Does it even make sense to speak of a
legal conclusion as true or false in the ordinary senses? By treating legal
conclusions as ordinary descriptive statements, appropriately evaluated as such,
the legal atheist rejects the validity of legal discourse as its own social practice
with its own norms, just as the religious atheist denies the basic validity of
religious faith as part of a distinct social practice with its own norms of belief

and disbelief.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALISM
A.

U.S. Constitutionalismas a Civil Religion

As Sanford Levinson recounts in the opening chapter of Constitutional
Faith, the use of religion as a metaphor for Americans' relationship with the
Constitution has a long and varied history.' George Washington, in his Farewell
Address, called upon his listeners to ensure that "the Constitution be sacredly
maintained." 65 Jefferson, on the other hand, criticized those who "look at
constitutions with sanctimonious reverence and deem them like the ark of the
covenant, too sacred to be touched." 6 6 In an early speech during an era of
frequent mob violence, 6 7 and long before he questioned whether "all the laws,
but one" should "go unexecuted . .. lest that one be violated," 6 8 Abraham
Lincoln exhorted the public to view "'reverence for the laws' as the 'political
religion of the nation,"' and declared that "[a]ll laws should be 'religiously
observed."' 6 9

.

"frankly assess the conflicting human values that are opposed in every controversy, appraise the
social importance of the precedents to which each claim appeals, [and] open the courtroom to all
evidence that will bring light to this delicate practical task of social adjustment . .
64
LEVINSON FAITH, supra note 10, at 9.
65
Id. at 10.
66

Id. at 9.
See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT 438 (2007) (presenting Lincoln's
1838 Lyceum address as a response to contemporary lawlessness).
68
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED
67

WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
69
LEVINSON FAITH, supra note 10, at 10. For early examples of U.S. constitutional law
scholars using religion as an explanatory frame, see Robert M. Cover, 'Nomos' and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitutionas Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 n.4
(1984) (citing Robert A. Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J.
455 (1984); Sanford Levinson, 'The Constitution'in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV.
123; Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional
'Interpretation,'58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985)). Looming in the background of any contemporary
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Levinson's book, originally published in 1988, represented a pathbreaking extension of the use of religion as an explanatory frame for U.S.
constitutionalism. 70 As Levinson describes Constitutional Faith in a 2011
afterword, the book uses "religious terminology, including, most prominently,
the difference between 'protestant' and 'catholic' approaches to the Constitution,
as analogies ...
[to] help the reader understand some of the contemporary
controversies about how to interpret the Constitution."7 1 In the book, Levinson
defines protestant and catholic constitutionalism along two axes:
As to source of doctrine, the protestant position is that it is the
constitutional text alone (A), while the catholic position is that
the source of doctrine is the text of the Constitution plus
unwritten tradition (B). As to the ultimate authority to interpret
the source of doctrine, the protestant position is based on the
legitimacy of individualized (or at least nonhierarchical
communal) interpretation (C), while the catholic position is that
the Supreme Court is the dispenser of ultimate interpretation
(D). 72
Levinson also investigates how we identify who is inside and outside the
civil religious community defined by U.S. constitutionalism, 7 3 and he asks
whether law schools are best understood as analogous to (secular) departments
of religion or (non-secular) divinity schools that expect their professors to share
in the school's religious faith.74
Jack Balkin has extended the comparison between religion and U.S.
constitutional culture even further. Balkin's 2011 Constitutional Redemption

attempt to make sense of a constitutional political order as a quasi-religious phenomenon is the
problematic figure of the Nazi political theorist Carl Schmitt, who famously argued that "[a]11
significant concepts of the modem theory of the state are secularized theological concepts." CARL
SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 36 (George

Schwab trans., 2005). It might be noted, however, that Schmitt was far from the first Western
political theorist to recognize intimate connections between theological ideas and the selfproclaimed authority of the modem European state. See HANS SLUGA, POLITICS AND THE SEARCH
FOR THE COMMON GOOD 103-04 (2014) (noting the recurrence of analogies between Christian
religious and European state authority in Hobbes, Hegel, Nietzsche, and anarchist thought).
7o
See generally LEVINSON FAITH, supra note 10.
71

72

Id. at 253.
Id. at 29. "It is not necessary that one be 'protestant' or 'catholic' along both dimensions."

Id.
7
See id. at 90-122 (investigating the role of various oaths); id. at 122-54 (questioning
whether "inner faith" is required for attachment to the Constitution, or whether outward behavior-

"good works"-are sufficient).
74
See, e.g., id. at 179. Paul Kahn considers the same analogy and concludes that law schools,
as they currently operate, are more comparable to divinity schools than to departments of religion:
"in law, we have only the professional school, without any corresponding academic department."
KAHN, supra note 59, at 4.
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presents the Constitution as a shared focus of political commitment in American
life, a common framework through which Americans of differing views can
engage one another by articulating their hopes for the future and their
understandings of the past.75 He draws on the analogy to religion to make sense
of a number of aspects of U.S. constitutionalism, including the role of historical
narratives in arguments over the Constitution's meaning, 7 6 the cultural
importance of "fidelity" to the Constitution,77 and the unavoidable risk of
constitutional idolatry.78
In this Part of the Article, I propose a further development of the analogy
between religion and America's constitutional culture. Drawing on the
discussions of religious and legal fundamentalism above, I suggest that
"constitutional fundamentalism" and its alternatives can provide a helpful
explanatory frame for making sense of the widely acknowledged and yet
perpetually unresolved role of ideological and other biases in constitutional
adjudication and legal scholarship on the Constitution.79
B.

ConstitutionalFundamentalism

Constitutional fundamentalism is legal fundamentalism applied to the
practice of constitutional interpretation. It is a denial of the distinguishing
differences between legal discourse and non-legal descriptive discourse about
the Constitution, a denial that the blending of description and prescription has a
proper role to play in legal determinations of constitutional meaning. The
constitutional fundamentalist assumes that legal statements of what the
Constitution means are what they superficially appear to be: purely descriptive.
In the fundamentalist's eyes, a judge's or legal scholar's view of what the
Constitution should mean can play no legitimate role in their statements of what

7

See

JACK

M.

BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST

WORLD (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION].
76

Id. at 1-16.

n

Id. at 103-39.

78

Id. at 73-102.

I note that Levinson also uses the phrase "constitutional fundamentalism" in passing in the
2011 afterword to Constitutional Faith, stating that "one finds a kind of constitutional
fundamentalism in contemporary American politics that was relatively (even if not completely)
absent a quarter century ago." LEVINSON FAITH, supra note 10, at 246. He goes on to gesture toward
the "[s]acralization" of the Constitution by "[w]orshippers" who view the 1787 text in a way
similar to Christian fundamentalists who view the Bible as "the 'unerring' word of God, to be
accepted rather than, say, subjected to rational critique and, if need be, 'amendment."' Id. at 25354. Somewhat similarly, Larry Kramer referred to the conservative majority on the Rehnquist
Court as "constitutional fundamentalists, acting to restore the Constitution to what they believe is
its true form. Like most forms of fundamentalism, their belief rests on an imagined past that never
existed." Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV.
L. REv. 4, 169 (2001).
79
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the Constitution does mean. If one violates the strict separation of description
and prescription, one has most likely erred or engaged in self-delusion. It does
not occur to the constitutional fundamentalist to describe this violation as no
violation at all, but as an adherence to the norms that have developed to govern
legal interpretations of the Constitution.
The fundamentalist's description of the Constitution's meaning is no less
influenced by her prescriptive preferences than the descriptions offered by her
opponents, but the fundamentalist is convinced that this is not the case. She is
convinced that her own legal view of the Constitution is simply an accurate
description, uninfluenced by her preferences, while the views of her legal
opponents are pervasively distorted by their personal biases. Compare the
Protestant fundamentalist who denies the distinction between religious and
scientific belief and on that basis insists that the events in the Bible must be
straightforward historical fact, while at the same time insisting that the events
described in the Koran never happened. The constitutional fundamentalist,
similarly, denies the distinction between legal and scholarly discourse and, on
that basis, insists that her understanding of the legal meaning of the Constitution
is simply what results when one undertakes a rigorously neutral, thorough
investigation, while her opponents' understanding is inappropriately tainted by
personal preferences about what should be the case. The constitutional
fundamentalist sees no intelligible third way between pure description and pure
prescription, assumes that legal interpretation must be a purely descriptive
practice, and chastises her opponents for allowing their prescriptive biases to
distort their descriptive conclusions.
The constitutional fundamentalist need not subscribe to any particular
methodology of constitutional interpretation. He may believe that the meaning
of the Constitution is determined by the structure of its text, or some form of
original understanding, or Supreme Court precedent, or a combination of these
elements and the principles of American democracy, or something else entirely.
Any number of sources may play a role in the constitutional fundamentalist's
explanation of what the Constitution means. The one thing that the constitutional
fundamentalist will not concede, however, is that one of the sources for his
interpretation is what he would like the Constitution to mean and his view of
what the Constitution should contain. It may be, the fundamentalist insists, that
as a matter of policy or moral principle, he would prefer the outcomes dictated
by the view of the Constitution he is presenting, but this personal preference is
neither here nor there. Any resemblance between his description and his
preferences is purely coincidental. The fact is, the fundamentalist concludes, the
view of the Constitution he is presenting just happens to be the most correctone.
A constitutional fundamentalist judge will insist that he approaches the
meaning of the Constitution only with an eye to arriving at an accurate
understanding. His job is to enforce the Constitution, not rewrite it. What he
wishes were included in the Constitution is irrelevant-no more relevant than an
umpire's wishes regarding who should win a baseball game. The constitutional
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fundamentalist judge views himself as nothing more than a neutral umpire,
applying the law of the Constitution to the facts of the cases that come before
him.
Of course, in reality, the constitutional fundamentalist judge-like any
judge faced with an open constitutional question-must choose between various
ways of interpreting the Constitution in light of the relevant precedents,80 and
within the ambit of his chosen methods, must choose between various specific
interpretations that can be produced using those methods. In practice, the judge
will almost inevitably make these choices based on his view of what the best
interpretation of the Constitution would be. It will be impossible in practice to
disentangle this notion of "best" from his own preferences.
Nevertheless, the constitutional fundamentalist judge may make a great
show of being forced to reach the conclusion he reaches, as though against his
will. He may even highlight those occasional instances when the conclusion he
reaches regarding what the Constitution requires conflicts with his policy
preferences, the outcome he would choose if he were simply a legislator. He may
present these moments of apparent conflict as evidence that his statements of the
meaning of the Constitution are determined by his best efforts to discern what is
the case, not by reliance on what he wishes were the case. Upon closer inspection,
of course, we may wonder whether these exceptional decisions were in fact in
conflict with the judge's view of what the law should be, or were instead in
accord with the judge's higher-level methodological preferences, which were in
turn shaped by the judge's view of what the law should be. Like Br'er Rabbit,8 1
the constitutional fundamentalist judge may make a great show of not wishing to
be forced to go to the place where he, in another sense, wishes to go. We might
even say that the fundamentalist's Constitution is often a kind of Briar Patch
Constitution: it routinely ends up forcing judges to head in the directions they
would have gone anyway. 82

80
A Supreme Court Justice will of course be much less constrained by precedent than a lowercourt judge who is potentially subject to appellate review.
s1
The History ofBrer Rabbit, BRER RABBIT (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.brerrabbit.com/thehistory-of-brer-rabbit/.
82
Judge Posner offers a thorough account of the behavior described here:
Justices occasionally, and sometimes credibly, issue express disclaimers that a
particular outcome for which they voted is one they would vote for as a
legislator .... But such discrepancies between personal and judicial positions
usually concern rather trivial issues, where the judicial position may be
supporting a more important, though not necessarily less personal, agenda of
the Justice.
So it is misleading when a Justice replies to a criticism of a controversial
decision that he or she joined by saying that it was a vote against the Justice's
"desire." People have multiple desires, often clashing, and then they must
weigh them against each other . ...
... Sometimes, moreover, what is involved in voting against one's seeming
druthers may be a calculation that the appearance of being "principled" is
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It might be objected at this point: why call the phenomenon summarized
above "fundamentalism"? When we think of religious fundamentalism,
especially in the context of American Protestantism, we most often think of a
group insisting on taking guidance solely from a sacred text or group of texts that
the group believes to be literally true and divinely inspired. 83 These texts can be
seen as the "foundations" to which religious fundamentalism insists we must
return, against the siren song of uprooted, secular modernity. By contrast,
constitutional fundamentalism as described above is not limited to those
interpreters who insist on returning to one or another original understanding of
the constitutional text. It encompasses the constitutional interpretations of
anyone who makes legal assertions about the Constitution-that is, assertions
that blend the descriptive and the prescriptive in the characteristic manner of
legal discourse-while insisting to the contrary that he is offering a purely
descriptive assertion, one that rests solely on reasoning about what is the case.
To begin with, it is useful to have some shorthand label for this rather
complicated but extremely common phenomenon. The term "fundamentalism"
is particularly appropriate because of the similarity between the underlying
attitudes of the religious and the constitutional fundamentalist, as I have
described them above. Both are participants in a social practice that calls upon
them to express belief in what appear to be factual claims. But in both cases,
participants in the practice treat these claims differently in important respects
from the ways that factual claims are ordinarily treated. In both cases, the
fundamentalist denies that these differences exist with regard to her own claims
and also denies that these differences should exist with regard to anyone else's
claims. The fundamentalist insists that the claims she believes are simply
factually true and that others' conflicting claims are simply factually false.
Examples of fundamentalism in U.S. constitutional adjudication and
scholarship are legion. One sees the pervasiveness of the attitude perhaps most
clearly when judges and legal scholars engage in theorizing about the proper
methods of constitutional interpretation. It is there that the interpreter's
rhetorically and politically effective. It fools people. So it is worth adhering to
principle when the cost to competing desires is slight.
Posner, supra note 4, at 50-52.
83
See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. In fact, the conflict between Biblical
literalism and its opponents long predated the fundamentalist backlash against Enlightenment
modernity. See, e.g., RUTHVEN, supra note 16, at 9 (noting that early church fathers such as St.

Augustine opposed widespread literalist understandings of the eschatological return of Jesus to
rule over an earthly kingdom by allegorizing and spiritualizing the notion of "the Kingdom of
God"). It is also possible to imagine forms of fundamentalism that rest on dogmas not stated in any
particular sacred text. Indeed, the inerrancy of the Biblical text was only one of the five dogmas
set forth in the early fundamentalist manifesto issued by the conservative Presbyterians of
Princeton in 1910. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 16, at 170-71. Their four other dogmas were: the
Virgin Birth of Christ, Christ's atonement for our sins on the cross, his bodily resurrection, and the
objective reality of his miracles. Id. Exclusive adherence to the literal truth of a sacred text is
arguably neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for fundamentalism.
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perceptions of the reasoning shaping her constitutional conclusions are most
often made explicit.
Most works of constitutional theory offer arguments concerning the
desirability of the approach they advocate to constitutional interpretation. In
doing so, they often tacitly or explicitly acknowledge that the choice between
general methods of constitutional interpretation is a choice, rather than a question
whose correct answer can be determined simply through factual analysis, without
the consideration of values and goals. 8 4 Because few works of constitutional
theory present themselves as the discovery of the correct general method for
interpreting the Constitution, as though this were an objective fact embedded in
the Constitution itself, few works of constitutional theory are fundamentalist in
the sense of presenting themselves as merely descriptive when in fact they are
based in part on prescriptive considerations about how the Constitution should
be interpreted in light of various practical and political goals.8 5
It is true that judges and legal scholars engaged in constitutional
theorizing will often use rhetoric suggesting that their general method of
interpreting the Constitution is the only proper or correct method, while the
methods of their opponents are improper or wrong. But when viewed charitably
and in context, such claims are nearly always accompanied by a recognition that
the sense in which one's own method is "proper" and all other methods are
"wrong" involves some consideration of contestable values. Claims for the
correctness of a general method of constitutional interpretation usually turn out
to be claims that the method best fulfills a number of widely shared goals such
as ensuring legal consistency, maintaining democratic accountability, protecting
rights where they should be protected, and maximizing institutional
competence-not the claim that the theorist has discovered a self-interpreting
interpretive manual buried in the Constitution itself and that anyone who refuses
to obey the rules of this manual necessarily displays infidelity to the Constitution.

Most works of constitutional theory, in other words, agree with Richard Fallon that "[t]he
written Constitution, by itself, cannot determine the correctness of any particular theory of
constitutional interpretation. Selection must reflect a judgment about which theory would yield the
best outcomes, as measured against relevant criteria." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a
Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 538 (1999).
8
But see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 37-69 (2009)
(discussing "hard originalism," variants of originalism that purport to be in some sense inescapably
true); accord Cass R. Sunstein, There is Nothing that InterpretationJust Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT.
193, 193 n.1 (2015) (presenting Larry Alexander and Walter Benn Michaels as writers who defend
the thesis that "the very idea of interpretation requires judges to adopt their own [i.e., Alexander's
or Michaels's] method of construing" the Constitution). Richard Fallon similarly states that
"proponents of text-based theories sometimes suggest that their theories are justified by their
uniquely excellent fit with the written Constitution and that normative argument is therefore
unnecessary." Fallon, supra note 84, at 540 n.9 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
84

AMERICA

1-5, 143-44 (1990)).
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Consider Justice Scalia. In a celebrated piece from 1997, he begins his
defense of his preferred form of originalism by criticizing the Supreme Court's
current practices:
Worse still, . . . it is known and understood that if [the logic of
the Supreme Court's constitutional precedents] fails to produce
what in the view of the current Supreme Court is the desirable
result for the case at hand, then, like good common-law judges,
the Court will distinguish the precedents, or narrow them, or if
all else fails overrule them, in order that the Constitution might
mean what it ought to mean.. . . If it is good, it is so. 86
In other words, like so many constitutional theorists, Justice Scalia
criticizes his opponents for smuggling prescriptive reasoming into their
descriptive conclusions-or what I have called in this Article engaging in legal
discourse. When Justice Scalia goes on to criticize this blending of descriptive
and prescriptive reasoning in the Supreme Court's constitutional adjudication by
stating this is "not the way of construing a democratically adopted text," 87 we.
might think at first that he assumes the history of the Constitution's adoptionimplies that his form of originalism is the only correct way of construing the
Constitution, in a purely factual sense, and regardless of anyone's values-just
as, one might argue, there is only one "correct" direction for winding a watch.
To wind most watches implies, by definition, rotating the crown clockwise; to
interpret the Constitution, it might be argued, implies determining the original
public meaning of the text. If you spin the crown counterclockwise, you are not
winding the watch; if you use the constitutional text as a vehicle for applying
current social values, you are not interpreting the Constitution.
In an earlier piece, however, Justice Scalia suggests that he does not
assume all constitutional interpreters are rationally required to adhere to his form
of originalism, regardless of their values or goals. He does not assume that the
nature of constitutional interpretation (for the U.S. Constitution) mandates the
use of his originalism in the same way that the nature of watch-winding mandates
a clockwise turn. In "Originalism: The Lesser Evil," from 1989, Justice Scalia
accepts that the choice between originalism and its alternatives is a choice about
88
which reasonable people might disagree in light of differing goals and values.
He argues in favor of his version of originalism on the grounds of democratic

86

Scalia, supra note 5, at 39.

87

Id. at

40.

8
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862, 864 (1989)
(arguing in favor of a "faint-hearted" form of originalism as "the lesser evil" after considering

some of "the principal difficulties with the originalist and nonoriginalist approaches").
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principle and various practical considerations, including the desirability of the
results it is likely to produce. 8 9 There is nothing fundamentalist in this position.90
It is not at the level of choosing a constitutional theory that judges and
legal scholars most often adopt a fundamentalist attitude, but at the level of
applyingthe theory. Both when judges and legal scholars describe in general how
the application of their constitutional theories work, and when they engage in
that application, fundamentalism appears to exert a powerful attraction. Again,
Justice Scalia provides a good illustration. After tacitly acknowledging that the
choice of constitutional theory may properly be shaped by prescriptive
considerations, Justice Scalia shows no willingness to acknowledge the same
with regard to the application of his theory. He recognizes that "it is often
exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text," 9
but insists that a judge's prescriptive preferences have no proper role in
originalist adjudication: "Originalism . . . establishes a historical criterion that is
conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself." 92
I do not suggest, mind you, that originalists always agree upon
their answer. There is plenty of room for disagreement as to
what original meaning was, and even more as to how that
original meaning applies to the situation before the court. But
the originalist at least knows what he is looking for: the original
meaning of the text. Often-indeed, I dare say usually-that is
easy to discern and simple to apply. 93
As critics of various forms of originalism have frequently observed,
statements like this are a wildly inaccurate estimation of the degree to which
forms of originalism like Justice Scalia's can or do provide determinacy and

89
See, e.g., id. at 855-56 (criticizing the liberty-enhancing benefit of nonoriginalism as
"illusory," because nonoriginalism can be used to contract as well as expand liberty); id. at 85657 (acknowledging the practical difficulty ofapplying originalism correctly); id. at 861 (presenting
as a weakness of originalism that it would sustain public flogging and "handbranding" against an
Eighth Amendment challenge).
9

But see ANTONIN SCALIA, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS

AND THE LAW 90, 135 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("[D]ocuments rarely specify how they are to be
construed-which does not mean that there is no right and no wrong construction."). Jamal Greene
presents Justice Scalia as more of a fundamentalist at the level of theory-choice than I have. See
Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism,97 GEO. L.J. 657, 658 (2009) (arguing that "Justice Scalia has

described an originalist approach to interpretation as a prerequisite to faithful application of a
written Constitution"). At the very least, Justice Scalia does not state explicitly that he believes the

Constitution itself, apart from any political or practical considerations, dictates that it can only be
interpreted correctly through the originalist methods that he describes.

9'

Scalia, supra note 88, at 856.

92

Id. at 864.

9

Scalia, supra note 5, at 45.
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constraint against the imposition of a judge's values. 9 4 Indeed, Scalia leaves
unspecified how judges are to decide when confronted with competing, plausible
interpretations of "the original meaning of the text." 9 5 In practice, the evidence
suggests that judges using originalist methods, including Justice Scalia, choose
the best interpretation-where "best" ordinarily ends up meaning, in practice,
the interpretation that comes closest to realizing the judge's values. 96 Yet even
as Justice Scalia blends descriptive and prescriptive reasoning in his originalist
legal practice, he insists that he is doing nothing of the kind. As we have seen, 97
he insists that he is simply providing an accurate historical description, like the

See also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalismas a PoliticalPractice: The Right's Living
94
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 545, 560, 562 (2006) (arguing that "[o]riginalism uses political
and litigation strategies to infuse the law of the Constitution with contemporary political meanings
that originalists find compelling," and that "[i]f Justices Thomas and Scalia are exemplars of the

kinds of originalist judges that the political practice of originalism seeks to appoint, then
originalism has been as much a political practice on the bench as off it"). Post and Siegel collect a
number of illustrations of Justices Thomas and Scalia selectively applying originalist methods to
reach conservative ends. See id. at 562-68. They also quote Mark Graber's observation that "[t]he
originalist foundations of Bush v. Gore remain a judicial mystery." Mark A. Graber, Clarence
Thomas and the Perils ofAmateur History, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT

DYNAMIC 70, 88 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003); compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) (Scalia, J., majority opinion), with id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On Heller, see, for
example, Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism,69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 609-10 (2008)
(arguing that the "new originalism," as illustrated by the "history-in-law" discourse of Heller,
the single .. . conventional
"cannot deliver on its promises," because its "search for ...
understanding of constitutional terms is doomed, at least in the most interesting cases"); Richard
A.
Posner,
In
Defense
of Looseness,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(Aug.
27,
2008),
https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness (describing the majority opinion in
Heller as "law office history" and a "snow job[]").
Scalia, supra note 5, at 45. Much less does he specify how judges are to proceed with the
9s
even less constrained process of constitutional "construction," if a distinction between
interpretation and construction is accepted. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM
4-6 n.2 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM] (discussing the different senses of
"constitutional interpretation," distinguishing "ascertainment of meaning" from "constitutional
and citing RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118-27 (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
KEITH E.
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5 (1999);
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND
construction,"

JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); and Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 291, 293-94, 300-07 (2007) as sources for the interpretation-construction distinction).
Throughout this Article, for convenience, I have ignored the arguments for a distinction between
the ascertainment of constitutional meaning and constitutional construction, collapsing both
practices under the label of "constitutional interpretation."
96
See supra note 94.
establishes a historical criterion
9
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 88, at 864 ("Originalism ...
that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself.").
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kinds of descriptions offered by historical scholars. 98 He becomes a
fundamentalist.
Justice Scalia is far from alone in adopting a fundamentalist attitude
when he turns from high-level constitutional theory choice to more concrete
considerations regarding the application of a theory's interpretive methods. The
constitutional fundamentalist label applies whenever a judge or legal scholar
presents her chosen constitutional theory as constraining her interpretation in an
ideologically neutral way, and then applies the theory in a way that is not
ideologically neutral, but instead aligns with her own ideological preferences. 9 9
Such behavior, needless to say, is not rare. 100 In the interest of space, I will offer
98

Id.

9
More generally, and taking into account the fact that a judge's or legal scholar's preferences
might not have an easily categorized ideological valence, the constitutional fundamentalist label
applies whenever a judge or legal scholar presents her constitutional interpretation as the result of
purely descriptive reasoning, uninfluenced by her own preferences regarding what the law should
be, when in fact the interpretation was shaped by these prescriptive preferences. This Article's
primary concern, however, is with the role of specifically ideological prescriptive preferences in
constitutional interpretation.
I also note that this Article has self-consciously alternated between describing constitutional
fundamentalism in terms of the way an interpreter presents her interpretations (publicly) to others,
as in the preceding paragraph, and in terms of an interpreter's (private) attitude toward her
interpretations, on the assumption that the public presentation and the private attitude will often
coincide, especially in the cases ofjudges and legal scholars. To the extent that there is a divergence
between the public presentation and the private attitude, a distinction could simply be drawn
between public or objective and private or subjective fundamentalism.
100
In a monumental string-citation, Barry Friedman quotes the following constitutional
theorists presenting their theories as a source of ideologically neutral constraint on judicial review:
Charles Black, Robert Bork, Ronald Dworkin, John Hart Ely, Akhil Reed Amar, Antonin Scalia,
and David Strauss. See Barry Friedman, The Politics ofJudicialReview, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 267
n.53 (2005); see also id. at 268 nn.57-58 (more sources expressing support for the imposition of
ideologically neutral constraints on judges). It would not be surprising if a review of these theorists'
applications of their ostensibly ideologically neutral and constraining methods turned out to show
a correlation between the theorist's constitutional interpretations and her (actually, all "his")
ideological leanings, as we saw in the case of Justice Scalia and will see in the case of Ackerman.
See generally, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996) (discovering in the Constitution a number of moral principles that happen
to be sympathetic to the ideological views of Ronald Dworkin).
Amar's recent work interpreting the contents of various unwritten sources of constitutional law
received particularly harsh criticism along these lines. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, How Many
Constitutions

Can

Liberals

Have?,

NEW

REPUBLIC

(Oct.

19,

2012),

https://newrepublic.com/article/108755/how-many-constitutions-liberals (reviewing AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY

(2012) and presenting Amar as "updating" the Constitution as the Catholic Church updates the
Bible; noting incredulously that Amar claims his constitutional views, no matter how "wild" they
may seem, "are in this .. . constitution; that he did not put them there"; and criticizing the book as
"not a work of legal analysis," but rather "the effusion of a visionary and a utopian-of an idolater
of the Constitution"). Although Amar can accurately note that not all of his specific constitutional
interpretations represent policies he would personally support-for example, he finds an individual
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only one further example of constitutional fundamentalism, drawn from the
works of a leading progressive constitutional theorist-partly in order to make
clear that constitutional fundamentalism has no necessary ideological valence.
Over the last three decades, Bruce Ackerman has developed a dualist
constitutional theory based on the notion that the American people sometimes
participate in a kind of elevated deliberative politics that transcends factional
self-interests. 01 Through these moments of "higher lawmaking," the people have
the power to amend the Constitution outside of the formal amendment
procedures in Article V.1 0 2 This allows Ackerman to say that the American
people amended the Constitution during the New Deal to allow the modem
administrative state, even though there were no formal amendments along these
lines-thus solving one of the great doctrinal puzzles of American constitutional

right to keep a gun in one's home-it is difficult to see how he could refute the subtler point that
the book's chapters reflect general constitutional visions that align with contemporary progressive
values, while equally plausible but anti-progressive constitutional visions have been excluded. See
David A. Strauss, Not Unwritten After All?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1550, 1561, 1563 (2013)
(praising Amar's "highly creative" arguments, but concluding that Amar's interpretations are the
result of "approach[ing] the written Constitution with certain ideals in mind," and suggesting that
someone with different ideals could most likely find no less persuasive support, using Amar's
tools, for less amenable constitutional visions, such as "the Economic Freedom Constitution, or
the Anti-Tax Constitution, or the States' Rights Constitution, or the Nativist Constitution").
101
See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 32-33 (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (defining higher lawmaking as a six-stage process, and analyzing the
civil rights revolution as an extra-Article V amendment signaled by the Supreme Court in Brown,
realized through landmark statutes, and consolidated by the "switch in time" of Milliken v.
Bradley); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 20-26 (1998) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (describing extra-Article V constitutional amendment as a fivestage process carried out during Republican Reconstruction, when it was led by Congress; and
again during and after the Great Depression, when it was led by the President); Bruce A. Ackerman,
The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1039, 1046 (1984)

[hereinafter Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures] (introducing the theory of dualist democracy and
arguing that "our Constitution is one great effort to distinguish between those rare acts of
representative government backed by the considered judgments of the mass of mobilized citizens
and the countless actions based on something less than this"); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove,
Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 799, 803-04 (1995) (arguing that the Americans
who fought the Second World War extratextually amended the Constitution to render the Treaty
Clause optional); ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 101, at 32-33, 58, 165-99, 266-67
(describing the theory of dualist democracy, outlining American constitutional history as a series

of three regimes, describing the constitutional politics of the Founding, and defining constitutional
moments as a four-stage process). Ackerman appears to have originally envisioned that the third
volume in the "We the People" series would analyze the extent to which Supreme Court
constitutional doctrine has served the function of preserving the American people's dualist
decisions. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 101, at 118 n.*; ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 101, at 349, 403. This now appears to be the topic of a projected
Volume 4. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 348 n.27

(2014) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION].
102
See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 101, 20-28.
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law. 0 3 More generally, Ackerman offers a clever defense of judicial review by
presenting it not as countermajoritarian, but as a way of preserving the higher
lawmaking of the American people after a "constitutional moment" has ended
and "normal politics" has returned.1 0 4 He also provides a sweeping and
influential view of American political history as a series of constitutional
regimes. 105
Ackerman's works depart from the norms of orthodox historical or
political science scholarship in a number of ways-for example, by introducing
fanciful dialogues with fictional characters,' 06 proposing constitutional
amendments favored by the author,' 0 7 offering a (self-described) "jeremiad
against the Europeanization of American constitutional thought,"' 08 exhorting
the reader to engage in constitutional politics in order to build a "more just and
free" constitutional order,1 0 9 and inviting the reader to defy the "elitist effort" of
the constitutional originalists on the Roberts Court "to erase the constitutional
legacy left behind by our parents and grandparents as they fought and won the
great popular struggles of the twentieth century."'10 Like Justice Scalia,
Ackerman quite openly acknowledges that his general methods of constitutional
interpretation are one choice among others."' He is not a fundamentalist at the
level of constitutional theory-choice.
From the start, Ackerman has also been clear that he is attempting to
produce accurate, ideologically neutral historical writing, and that his
constitutional theory is intended to provide a serious method of constitutional
interpretation that could be adopted by practicing lawyers and judges,

103

ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 101, at 63-78.

10

See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 101, at 9-10.
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 101, at 46-49, 63-78, 258; Ackerman,
The Storrs Lectures, supra note 101, at 1039-40.
06
See, e.g., ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 101, at 23-26.
105

07

Id. at 33.

108

Id.

109

See, e.g., id. at 5, 32, 57; ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 101, at 34 ("1
am .. . urging you to ... grant full constitutional status to the landmark statutes of the civil rights
revolution."); id. at 35 ("[W]e must redefine the [constitutional] canon.").
110
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 101, at 19; see also id. at 27 ("Recent

Democratic victories have halted this dynamic for the moment. The only question is whether the
conservative majority on the Court will use its remaining years to stage a full-scale assault on the
twentieth century.").
II
See id. at 36 (presenting his approach to constitutional interpretation as a "proposal" that
might or might not be adopted); id. at 1070-71 (offering reasons "why all [the] effort" involved in
his theory's historical reinterpretations "might prove worthwhile").
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presumably including the Justices of the Supreme Court.11 2 As he writes in the
most recent volume of We the People:
For me, the "living Constitution" is not a convenient slogan for
transforming our very imperfect Constitution into something
better. While the effort to make the Constitution into something
truly wonderful is an ever-present temptation, the problem with
this high-sounding aspiration is obvious: there are lots of
competing visions of a better America, and the Constitution
shouldn't be hijacked by any one of them. The aim of
interpretation is to understand the historical commitments that
have actually been made by the American people, not those that
one or another philosopher thinks they should have made. 113
Ackerman notes that if his constitutional theory-his "proposal"-is
adopted ("and stranger things have happened"), "legal debate would take on a
different shape."'' 4 His "ultimate aim, in short, is to deny that law is politics by
other means and that constitutional interpretation is mere pretense.""s "[M]y
task," he6 writes, "is to interpret the American Constitution as it is, not as it ought
to be."'

1

Despite Ackerman's frequent declarations of the intended neutrality of
his interpretations, however, the results have always seemed peculiarly in line
with Ackerman's progressive ideological sympathies." 7 In other words,
Ackerman, like Justice Scalia, falls into an attitude of fundamentalism at the level
of theory-application. He insists that he is simply offering a neutral description
of the meaning of the Constitution, grounded in accurate historical scholarship-

112

See, e.g., Ackerman,

The Storrs Lectures, supra note

101, at 1048 (arguing that

constitutional lawyers "can no longer allow" themselves to be "blind . . . to the distinctive dualistic
logic of their own democratic system," with the rhetorical suggestion that dualist democracy is
simply an accurate description of what American constitutionalism is); id. at 1057 (suggesting that
his theory allows lawyers to understand "the existing system of legal principles in a new, and
historically deeper, way"); id. at 1070 ("[I]f the interpretivist is serious about interpretation, he
cannot refuse to read a text simply because he finds its message inconvenient."). In The Storrs
Lectures, perhaps more than in later works, Ackerman acknowledges a tension between the work

of "professional historians" and the kind of grand historical fiarrative project he seeks to develop.
See id. at 1052.
113

ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 101, at 34-35.

114

Id. at 36.

115

Id.
Id. at 71. In a blog post responding to commentary on Volume 3, Ackerman reaffirmed his

116

belief that "the ongoing effort to define Wechslerian 'neutral principles' is the hallmark of a
successful constitutional culture." Bruce Ackerman, A Third Founding: Part Two-Fidelity or
Betrayal?, BALKINIZATION (May 22, 2014), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/05/a-third-founding-

fidelity-or-betrayal.html.
117

For an early expression of these sympathies, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN

THE LIBERAL STATE (1981).
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when, in fact, it has been obvious to most observers that he is blending
prescription and description in the manner of a legal advocate." 8 After
describing in an early review of "We the People: Volume I" how Ackerman
makes strategic use of the Bork nomination as evidence that Reagan
Republicanism represented a failed constitutional moment, Suzanna Sherry dryly
notes: "All this may not tell us very much about constitutional politics, but it tells
us quite a bit about Bruce Ackerman's politics.""19

See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, The Defects ofDualism, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 955, 964 (1992)
("Constitutional scholars often get in trouble claiming that the Framers saw things just the way
they themselves do, and Ackerman is no exception."); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional
Fact/ConstitutionalFiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of ConstitutionalMoments,
44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 770, 778-79, 785, 789-93 (1992) (criticizing Ackerman's selective
historical methods, including his failure to acknowledge the racially discriminatory administration
of the New Deal; describing Ackerman's "'intergenerational synthesis"' defense of Brown as a
descent "from implausibility to fantasy"; and noting that Ackerman abandons "his own
constraining criteria" for the definition of constitutional moments, leading one to wonder: "If the
1960s civil rights movement, why not the 1920s Ku Klux Klan crusade?"). In a critique of
Ackerman's theory, the historian Jack Rakove goes to great lengths to make charitable concessions
for the differences between professional historical scholarship and "[t]he rhetorical conventions of
legal writing," which "are shaped by advocatorial and even adversarial norms." Jack N. Rakove,
The Super-Legality of the Constitution, or, a Federalist Critique of Bruce Ackerman's NeoFederalism, 108 YALE L.J. 1931, 1936 (1999). Rakove concludes that We the People nevertheless
exposes itself to the charge "that it is, in the end, yet another exercise in the partial appropriation
of historical materials for theoretical ends." Id. at 1958 ("[I]f nothing else, We the People is as
advocatorial a work of normative constitutional theory as one can ever imagine encountering.").
In a review of We the People: Volume II and a work by Akhil Amar, Rakove makes similar points.
See Jack N. Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest ofHistory, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 191, 195 (1999)
118

(reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998))

("While the conventions of legal scholarship need not and often do not mirror the conventions of
legal argument, one sometimes has the impression that the realms of academic and professional
writing do overlap in significant ways."); id. at 203 ("[N]o conventional constitutional historian
would ever dream of developing a general theory of transformation capable of subsuming three
such disparate events [i.e., the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal] under one
heading[.]"); id. at 209 (concluding that "Ackerman's model ... is linked much more to its
normative pretensions . . . than to its academic and analytical conventions"); id. at 211 (criticizing
Ackerman's presentation of Brown as merely a synthesis of earlier higher lawmaking by noting:
"to characterize the changes in race relations in the 1950s and 1960s as less than transformativeor as merely synthetic of the constitutional changes of the 1930s-seems a remarkably stunted
assessment of their impact on our politics and jurisprudence alike"). By presenting the civil rights
revolution as a constitutional moment in We the People: Volume III, Ackerman appears to have
abandoned the argument, criticized by Klarman and Rakove, that Brown was merely a synthesis of
Reconstruction and New Deal higher lawmaking. CompareACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supranote

101, at 137, 141 (rejecting view of Brown as "an exercise in constitutional politics" and presenting
the decision as preservasionist synthesis), with ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note

101, at 48 (presenting Brown as a "constitutional signal," that is, the beginning of a constitutional
moment), and id. at 76 (assuming the existence of a "newly established New Deal-Civil Rights
constitution" by 1968). It is now unclear whether Ackerman would present Brown as correctly
decided under the Constitution in 1954.
119
Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 933 (1992).
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One sees Ackerman's constitutional fundamentalism most clearly in his
lawyerly evasions of historical evidence suggesting that the American people
have often disagreed profoundly with his progressive ideals. Michael McConnell
and others have thoroughly documented the extent to which the Jim Crow Era
was indeed a sustained era in our constitutional history, one characterized by
virulent, deep-rooted racism.120 The racist regime was powerfully reflected in all
branches of government and enjoyed the support of the majority of the American
public. 121 McConnell argues in detail that "the end of Reconstruction precisely
fits Ackerman's model of a constitutional moment, meeting all four of his
criteria."l22 Yet Ackerman does not so much as acknowledge the possibility of a
Jim Crow Republic in We the People: Volume I. In response to McConnell's
arguments, Ackerman includes a lengthy footnote in Volume II, continuing to
insist on technical violations that prevent the Jim Crow Era from representing a
constitutional moment.1 23
These sophisticated maneuvers ring especially hollow, however, in light
of Volume III, where Ackerman shows himself willing to revise earlier technical
requirements and aspects of his grand historical narrative in order to proclaim
that the civil rights movement was an instance of higher lawmaking.1 24 Why is
Ackerman willing to make revisions to his scheme in order to admit the abolition
of Jim Crow as a constitutional moment, but not willing to do the same for the

120
See Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten ConstitutionalMoment, 11 CONST. COMMENT.
115, 116 (1994) [hereinafter McConnell, Forgotten] ("[F]or almost eighty years of our history,
from 1877 until 1954 (if not longer), the constitutional principles actually put into practice had
nothing to do with any of the constitutional moments recognized by the theory, but were in direct
repudiation of the principles of the Reconstruction Amendments."); see generally Michael J.
Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303 (1998). As an illustration of the pervasiveness
of fundamentalism among constitutional theorists, I note that McConnell, after criticizing

Ackerman's wishful thinking regarding Jim Crow, arguably displays his own wishful thinking by
defending the correctness of Brown as an originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and ConstitutionalTheory: A Response to Professor

McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1928 (1995) ("It is not surprising that Professor McConnell
undertook his originalist defense of Brown. As he states in his introduction, any constitutional
theory unable to accommodate Brown 'is seriously discredited."') (quoting Michael W.
McConnell, Originalismand the DesegregationDecisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952 (1995)); cf
McConnell, Forgotten, supra note 120, at 142 n.93 (1994) ("My own view is that the political
principles of the Reconstruction Amendments were simply an extension of the fundamental

principles of the Founding, which, because of slavery, had never been fully achieved.").
121

See, e.g., BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 75, at 202 ("The Jim Crow
republic was the result of an American politics and constitutional culture that installed judges and
Supreme Court justices who legitimized the dehumanization of their fellow citizens for decades.").
122
See McConnell, Forgotten,supra note 120, at 122.
123

See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 101, at 471-74 n.126.
124
See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 101, at 41 (noting that the Second
Reconstruction used a different "institutional grammar" from previous constitutional moments);
id. at 47 (replacing four-stage model of constitutional moment introduced in ACKERMAN,
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 101, at 266-67 with new six-stage model).
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institutionalization of Jim Crow? One strongly suspects it is because Ackerman
wants the former to play a central role in our constitutional identity, and does not
want the latter to do so. Despite his protestations, his constitutional
interpretations appear to be the result of prescriptive reasoning about what the
Constitution should contain as well as descriptive reasoning about what it does
contain.
Another illustration of Ackerman's constitutional fundamentalism can
be found in his insistence that the Reagan Era has not been a constitutional
moment-not even a lesser one. An anecdote from Laurence Tribe gives a sense
of Ackerman's underlying commitments:
[T]he political earthquake represented by the ascendancy of the
Republican Party to the control of both Houses of Congress in
November 1994 for the first time in 40 years can hardly be
ignored by someone with Professor Ackerman's views. Yet,
when the newly composed House of Representatives took the
comparatively modest step . . . of requiring that any increase in
income tax rates, before it is deemed to have passed the House,
must receive a three-fifths majority, . . . Professor Ackerman
first opined that this was certainly unconstitutional (despite the
Constitution's silence on this precise point) . .. and then
launched a lawsuit on behalf of some members of the House of
Representatives seeking a judicial declaration that his view is
correct. 125

125
Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1300 n.250 (1995) [hereinafter Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously] (citations omitted); see also Mark Tushnet, Living in A
ConstitutionalMoment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 845, 847
(1996) (considering evidence for the 1994 elections and the [Republican's] "Contract" with
America as elements of a constitutional moment, while recognizing that Ackerman's formal
criteria for a constitutional moment had not been satisfied). Of course, Ackerman's work as a legal

advocate does not provide evidence of advocacy in his scholarship.
In the interest of completeness, I also note that Tribe, like McConnell, could be described as a
constitutional fundamentalist, as Henry Monaghan argued in different terms over three decades
ago. See Monaghan, supra note 2, at 353; compare Richard A. Posner, The ConstitutionAs Mirror:
Tribe's Constitutional Choices, 84 MICH. L. REv. 551 (1986) (presenting Tribe as arguing "in
effect and often in words close to these, that the Constitution is what we want it to be (hence
'choices') and that what we should want it to be is the charter of a radically egalitarian society"),
and ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 199, 355 (1990) (criticizing Tribe and other
theorists for succumbing to "the temptations of utopia," and arguing that "Tribe's constitutional

theory is difficult to describe, for it is protean and takes whatever form is necessary at the moment
to reach a desired result"), with Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously, supra note 125, at
1224-25 ("1 continue to hold the view-or perhaps adhere to the faith-that there are legal truths
out there ... and that legal discourse itself imposes serious constraints," such that constitutional
law is not "merely a language for pressing one's preferences."), and id. at 1235-49 (interpreting
the Constitution through the lens of mathematical topology). Tribe's more recent work uses
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Ackerman continues to protest in Volume II, however, that he is
evaluating the Reagan Revolution in a purely disinterested, ideologically neutral
fashion, and that it simply happens not to qualify as a constitutional moment
according to the relevant historical precedents:
We will not always like what we see. As this project
took shape during the 1980's ... [a]s a liberal comiitted to
social justice, I was not amused at the prospect of playing into
the hands of the Reagan Revolution.
But I was determined to publish nonetheless. The
Constitution is not the exclusive possession of those who share
my politics ...
During the 1980's,... I would not join my fellow
liberals on the field of constitutional polemics-castigating the
Rehnquist Court and all its works, and insisting that the Warren
Court had gotten the Constitution right once and for all.... I
owed it to my fellow citizens to test the Reagan years against the

carefully hedged language that leaves unclear whether he views his conclusions as dictated purely
by neutral methods, or rather as shaped by his thoughts on what the Constitution ought to mean.
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 32 (2008) (denying that "[t]his book"

is "a selective brief in support of rights widely associated with the cultural and political Left"); id.
at 26, 34 (acknowledging some degree of indeterminacy in constitutional meaning, yet noting that
"we cannot find in the invisible Constitution anything and everything we might wish"); id. at 36
(insisting that "the illumination of the invisible Constitution [is] subject to nonarbitrary, although
contestable, constraints," and that "we may, and do, reach conclusions about the more controversial
contents of the invisible Constitution-conclusions that we may evaluate . .. in accordance with
criteria that go beyond mere personal preference"); id. at 37, 42 (acknowledging, however, that
"[r]easoning about the invisible Constitution's contents must, of course, be channeled to some
degree by subjective considerations," and recognizing that "my beliefs about the substance of the
invisible Constitution .. . figure occasionally in what follows," but nevertheless insisting that the
interpretation of the invisible Constitution "must . . be disciplined and driven by more than
desired results"); id. at 40-41 (arguing that recognition of the invisible Constitution supports some
conservative and some progressive claims, but that "the invisible Constitution's reality" is a "truth"
that can only be denied through "pretense"); id. at 43 (arguing that the invisible Constitution is
linked with certain "values that are not inherently 'liberal' or inherently 'conservative' but are
broadly committed to the dignity of the human person and the flourishing of humane aspirations");
id. at 155 (identifying "six distinct but overlapping modes of construction in forming the invisible
Constitution: geometric, geodesic, global, geological, gravitational,and gyroscopic"); id. at 135,
193 (ultimately concluding, for example, that the invisible Constitution "prevent[s] the state from
interfering in the consensual sexual intimacies of couples acting in private, regardless of their
gender or sexual orientation," and that "the premises of self-government might entail embrace of
substantive liberties such as reproductive freedom").
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relevant
constitutional
Roosevelt years. 126

benchmarks-in

particular,

the

In the end, Ackerman refuses to recognize a constitutional moment in
the Reagan Revolution-despite the fact that the Reagan Administration
promoted itself as the vehicle for a new vision of governance that would break
with the existing regime, including its ("activist") understanding of the
Constitution; despite this new vision of governance becoming the subject of
focused public dispute and interbranch conflict; despite the proponents of the
vision achieving repeated electoral victories in part because of it; and despite the
fact that ultimately even the vision's partisan opponents came to acquiesce in it,
including its ("originalist") constitutional commitments.1 2 7 One suspects that a
conservative Ackerman could have found some way to describe the preceding
developments as an instance of successful constitutional politics.
In sum, while Ackerman has seemed eager to seize upon sometimes
questionable historical evidence that supported the formal classification of the
New Deal and the Second Reconstruction as successful constitutional
moments,128 he has seemed less willing to perform such innovative
interpretations on behalf of the Jim Crow Era or the Reagan Revolution. Yet he
insists upon the ideological neutrality of his constitutional interpretations. Like
Justice Scalia and so many others, he has adopted a constitutional fundamentalist
stance.

126
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 101, at 419; see also id. at 420 ("Whatever
happens, it will be the task of constitutional lawyers to judge the new movement by the benchmarks
of the past-and tell the truth, as best they can, to their fellow citizens.").
127
Compare President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981),

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43130 ("In this present crisis, government is not the
solution to our problem; government is the problem."), with President William J. Clinton, 1996

State

of

the

Union

Address

(Jan.

23,

1996),

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=53091 ("The era of big government is over.").
For an indication of the rhetorical triumph of "originalism," see, for example, BALKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 75, at 3-4.

128
See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The
Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L.J. 2077, 2111 (1999) (concluding after

voluminous review of historical evidence that "all of these considerations fail to demonstrate the
validity of Ackerman's implication that in 1936 the voters were consciously amending the
Constitution"); ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 101, at 70-72 (presenting 1964

presidential election as a "triggering election" for the civil rights revolution, even though other
issues were prominent and many Southern Democrats apparently voted for Johnson as the
candidate of the party and the region, rather than based on support for civil rights); BALKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 75, at 240-41 (noting that Roosevelt did not present
himself as seeking to amend the Constitution but to uphold its "text .. . and its commonsense
purposes" against the Supreme Court's misinterpretations).
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ConstitutionalAtheism

A legal atheist is someone who agrees with legal fundamentalists that
statements of the law in legal discourse aim to be purely descriptive, and ask to
be evaluated based solely on their descriptive accuracy. But the legal atheist also
typically believes that the law is so pervaded by indeterminacy,
underdetermination, and inconsistency that such descriptive accuracy is rarely
possible. As a result, when the legal atheist encounters a typical legal
conclusion-stated as a straightforward description, but arising out of a swirling
brew of description and prescription, disinterested reasoning and hope-the legal
atheist will most often conclude that the claim is simply inaccurate as a
description of what the law is.
By extension, a constitutional atheist could be described as someone
who agrees with constitutional fundamentalists that legal statements of the
meaning of the Constitution should simply describe what is in the Constitution,
not what they believe should be there. Unlike constitutional fundamentalists,
however, the constitutional atheist believes that nearly all constitutional
interpretations in interesting or hard cases are insufficiently justified by the
available legal materials. Legal interpretations of the Constitution in these cases
assert the existence of determinate answers that can be discerned through the
application of ideologically neutral interpretive tools, when in fact no such
answers exist. Like a religious atheist observing a debate between two religious
believers over the existence or non-existence of various deities, a constitutional
atheist confronted with a legal debate between proponents of conservative and
progressive readings of some hotly contested constitutional provision will find
the spectacle at best amusing, more likely embarrassing, and at worst evidence
of intellectual corruption. It is clear to the constitutional atheist that the views of
the participants in the constitutional debate are obviously, profoundly shaped by
their (ideological) views of what the Constitution should mean. Because the
participants nevertheless present their views in the form of assertions about what
the Constitution does mean, the constitutional atheist can hardly resist perceiving
those views as erroneous, deluded, or perhaps even fraudulent.
If the constitutional fundamentalist insists that his views have nothing to
do with his personal ideological preferences, and that he arrived at his
understanding of the Constitution not because that understanding favors his
preferences-although it does-but simply because it happens to be the correct
understanding, the constitutional atheist may wonder, incredulously: What does
it even mean to say that one interpretive approach to the Constitution on this
issue is the correct one, when there are quite evidently so many different
approaches to choose from? And could any thinking human being be so blind to
his own motivated reasoning that he truly believes the Constitution just happens
to require, again and again, what he would wish it to require? Does the
progressive constitutional fundamentalist think it is merely a grand coincidence
that year after year, in debate after constitutional debate, he finds that the
Constitution demands progressive outcomes, while conservative constitutional
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interpreters who seem no less professionally competent than himself reach the
contrary conclusion?
The constitutional atheist has these responses because she lacks the
fundamentalist's faith. Where the fundamentalist sees evidence of the
Constitution's profound wisdom,1 2 9 and the non-fundamentalist may see proof
of the Constitution's redemptive potential, the atheist sees only belief in selfserving myths. The constitutional atheist believes we would be better off
confronting the Constitution as it actually is, stripped of our childish illusions,
even if the result is ideologically embarrassing or offers relatively little legal
guidance or constraint. 130 This skepticism toward inherited myths, the atheist
believes, is what intellectual maturity demands. We must cast off our comforting
self-deceptions and face reality as it truly is in all its unforgiving harshness.
The most wide-ranging and influential statement of constitutional
atheism remains Mark Tushnet's recently reissued 1988 book, Red, White, and
Blue: A CriticalAnalysis of ConstitutionalLaw.' 3 1 Tushnet addresses each of the

129
If the atheist's view of constitutional indeterminacy is correct, it might also cast an
unflattering light on the spectacle of constitutional interpreters praising the timeless wisdom of the
Constitution. To the extent that they ventriloquize their own preferences through the Constitution's
antique wooden mouth, and then praise the resulting commands, they praise their own wisdom.
130
From the progressives onward, those scholars who have been most open to the possibility
that the ideological content of the Constitution might be anti-democratic, oligarchic, racist, or
otherwise undesirable from a contemporary liberal point of view, have naturally tended to oppose
allowing the "dead hand" of these retrograde commitments to constrain our current politics. See,
e.g., Klarman, supra note 10, at 381, 383-84. No judge or theorist, to my knowledge, has endorsed
the position that the Constitution requires generally highly repugnant outcomes with regard to

rights and classifications, but nevertheless must be obeyed because it is the law. This is itself an
indication of the intermingling of descriptive and prescriptive reasoning that pervades legal thought

on the Constitution. It is also suggestive that while leftist scholars have produced innumerable
works condemning the relentless misdeeds of American governments since the Founding, no legal
theorist, so far as I know, has produced a detailed, speculative compendium of constitutional rightsdoctrine derived from this leftist counter-narrative of American history. There appears to be no
room in the legal academic conversation, or at least no demand, for a detailed attempt at a purely
descriptive doctrinal elaboration of "our white supremacist oligarchic Constitution," or what might
simply be called "our appalling Constitution," "the Constitution no one wants"-the constitutional
meanings that America's institutional power structures, as understood by their leftist academic
critics, naturally would have produced.
131

MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(2d ed. 2015) [hereinafter TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE]. The book incorporates and builds on
Tushnet's canonical article applying the mostly private-law-based arguments of the Critical Legal
Studies movement to constitutional law. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique ofInterpretivism andNeutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983). In an Afterword
to the second edition, Tushnet summarizes developments in constitutional theory and especially
originalism since 1988, concluding that it remains the case that none of the approaches to
constitutional interpretation that he has surveyed "accomplished the goals their adherents set for
themselves-to authorize and constrain constitutional interpretation, primarily by the courts." See
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE, supra note 131, at 338. In other words, he would see no reason

to change the book's original conclusion: "Critique is all there is." See id.
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leading grand constitutional theories of the era, suggesting that none of them can
"be made coherent."l32 A large part of Tushnet's argument rests on the notion
that there are deep, irreconcilable ideological conflicts in American political
culture and constitutional thought.1 3 3 But Tushnet also returns repeatedly to the
indeterminacy of each theory, the extent to which "the maximum coherent
content" of each theory, based on its premises, is "limited." 1 3 4 Each theory
purports to constrain judges, yet upon closer inspection, the constraints imposed
are surprisingly weak.
For example, some originalists would have us rely on the Framers'
meanings, but the interpretive reconstruction of these meanings will lack the
"determinacy" needed to satisfy originalism's "underlying goals." 35 Moreover,
"few people today believe that phrases like due process of law or the freedom of
speech have the kind of plain meaning that the framers believed they had." 36 It
is true that "Justice Hugo Black did say that, but ... nobody believed him," and
when conservatives attempt to "reiterate this position today, . . . it is simply a
lie." 37 "[R]adical indeterminacy of meaning is, within a liberal community,

132

TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE, supra note 131, at 179.

133

See generally TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE, supra note 131.
Id. As Tushnet summarizes his perspective elsewhere:

134

Constitutional theories ... have no determinate or even interesting resultbased content. There is right-wing originalism and left-wing originalism.
There is right-wing natural law and left-wing natural law. There is right-wing
"representation-reinforcing review" and left-wing "representation-reinforcing
review." And ... there is right-wing Dworkinism and left-wing Dworkinism.
Mark V. Tushnet, Does ConstitutionalTheory Matter?: A Comment, 65 TEx. L. REv. 777, 782-83

(1987).
1s
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE, supra note 131, at 41; see also id at 43 (noting "the
indeterminacy of identifications of functional equivalents" in originalism); id. at 57 (noting that

his critiques of originalism and "neutral principles" "have argued that there are no determinate
continuities derivable from history or legal principle"). For other examples of Tushnet criticizing
the indeterminacy and resulting lack of constraint of grand constitutional theories, see id. at 66
(arguing that one theorist's textualism "allows us to proliferate underlying values essentially at will
and then provides no constraints on the courts in choosing how to accommodate this plurality of

values in any particular case"); id. at 99 (arguing that Ely's representation reinforcement "leaves
the judges unconstrained"); id. at 118 (arguing that there is a recurring difficulty in "drawing
conclusions about particular problems from the high-level abstractions of systematic moral
philosophy"); id. at 164 (arguing that the appeal to public values in theorists like Fiss, Michelman,
and Sunstein "rarely gives content to the public values it invokes"); id. at 176 (arguing that "Perry
and Tribe do not overcome the difficulty that the existence of a plurality of traditions poses for

their traditionalism"); id. at 182 (arguing that the eclectic combination of grand theories remains
indeterminate in the absence of a higher theory); id. at 183 (arguing that intuitive "balancing" based
on judges' candor and sensitive perceptions "really does not constrain the judges").
136
Id. at 24.
137
Id. at 24 n. 14. Indeed, no discussion of constitutional fundamentalism would be complete
without some reference to Justice Hugo Black, who seems to fulfill the criteria of constitutional
fundamentalism almost no matter how they are defined. As early as 1961, a writer in the Columbia
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inevitable."' 3 8 Even with regard to the "mathematical" provisions of the
Constitution, such as the requirement that the President be at least 35 years old,
Tushnet denies that the text is ahistorically clear. He observes that under the right
set of political circumstances, even ostensibly "easy cases" involving these
provisions might become hard cases.1 3 9
Tushnet's arguments not only parallel the content of religious atheism,
as defined above, but often echo religious atheism's tone. Nothing is sacred in
the atheist's view of constitutional interpretation. Lacking faith, he sometimes
finds it difficult even to take seriously the contentions of the noisily competing
faithful. Playful mockery alternates with exasperated criticism and occasional
scorn, as in Tushnet's accusation of conservative fraud and the irony he directs
toward Justice Black's constitutional fundamentalism.1 40
A more recent expression of constitutional atheism can be found in Louis
Michael Seidman's On ConstitutionalDisobedience.141 Seidman argues that we
should stop pretending we owe an obligation of obedience to the Constitution,
and that we should instead simply do what we believe to be right, all things
considered: "[W]hy should we take another course of action just because of
words written down on a piece of paper more than two hundred years ago?"1 4 2
Like a religious atheist calling upon believers to abandon their reliance on
archaic commands in a long-ago religious text, and instead simply to do what is
right, Seidman encourages We the People to free ourselves from the shackles of
constitutional religion and to chart our own course through history. "We should
give up on the pernicious myth that we are bound in conscience to obey the
commands of people who died several hundred years ago." 4 3 Again echoing a

Law Review referred to Justice Black as a "constitutional fundamentalist," probably with assumed
reference to the Justice's insistence on the literal meaning of constitutional phrases such as
"Congress shall make no law . . abridging the freedom of speech ..... See Murray A. Gordon,
Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1537, 1539 (1961);
Sanford Levinson, Judicial Engagement in Enforcing Limits on Government Power, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 973, 980 & n.45 (2012) (citing ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY

491 (2d ed. 1997)).
'

TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE, supra note 131, at 63.

See id. at 60-62 (discussing circumstances in which the counting of votes in the electoral
college for a sixteen-year-old guru could become a "hard case").
140
See also Mark V. Tushnet, The New Marketplace of Ideas: A Review of Reconstructing
American Law by Bruce Ackerman, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 857 (1984) (expressing initial
exasperation "close to outrage" toward a "pompous and smug" new work by Bruce Ackerman);
Mark Tushnet, Treatise Writing During ConstitutionalMoments, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 251
& n.2 (2005) (noting that he once wrote "what in the legal academy counts as a notorious review
of the first edition of Laurence Tribe's treatise" and citing Mark Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 694 (1980)).
'

141

See SEIDMAN, supra note 10.

142

Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.

143
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religious atheist, Seidman views the premises of faith as nothing more than
myths, and encourages us to discard them. 144
Seidman's constitutional atheism rests, like Tushnet's, in part on a belief
in the widespread indeterminacy of constitutional meaning.1 4 5 This
indeterminacy leaves room for competing advocates to fill in the constitutional
silences with their own ideological preferences. In characteristic atheist fashion,
Seidman presents the smuggling of ideological preferences into ostensibly
descriptive constitutional interpretation as illegitimate: "If 'due process' means
whatever contemporaries think that it ought to mean, then we are no longer
bound by constitutional language in a meaningful sense." 4 6
Against the discordant choir of prominent scholars, judges, and legal
activists defending varieties of constitutional fundamentalism, the number of

44

See also id. at 10 ("Does the success of our country really depend on belief in a myth?"). A

particular target of Seidman's critique is what might be called bad faith constitutionalism, in which
the believer pretends that he is not free to choose otherwise, because the Constitution has already
made the choice for him. Id. at 7, 28; cf Kennedy, The Hermeneuticsof Suspicion, supra note 61,

at 133-34 ("The legalist jurist [displays Sartrean bad faith] when he denies the role of his
ideological predilections in generating the outcome he will justify in the language of legal
necessity."). Kennedy quotes Judge Posner using the same language:
But the choice of that interpretive rule is not something that can be derived by
reasoning from agreed-upon premises. The originalist's pretense that it can be

makes originalism an example of bad faith in Sartre's sense-bad faith as the
denial of freedom to choose, and so shirking of personal responsibility. Similar
examples abound at the liberal end of the ideological spectrum.
Id. at 134 (quoting POSNER, supra note 11, at 104).
145
See, e.g., SEIDMAN, supra note 10, at 6 (noting that "at this late date, we cannot know what
the people's voice actually said" in the ratification of the Constitution).
146
SEIDMAN, supra note 10, at 13 (emphasis added). I note that there is also a respect in which

the label of constitutional atheist does not quite fit Seidman's book. While Seidman takes no
position on Tushnet's argument that even the mathematical provisions of the Constitution could be
made indeterminate under sufficiently strange political circumstances, he emphasizes that under
our circumstances, some provisions of the Constitution are, in Sanford Levinson's phrase, "hard

wired." Id. at 12-13. With respect to these hard-wired aspects, Seidman might (half-jokingly) be
described less as a constitutional atheist and more as a constitutional satanist. That is, with regard
to these especially pernicious because especially unmovable features of the constitutional
landscape, Seidman believes that it is possible to listen to the Constitution's voice without merely
discovering an echo of our own. Id. In fact, he believes the Constitution speaks all too clearly on
these points. Seidman asks us to turn our backs on these portions of the Constitution and to refuse
to grant them any dominion over us. Id. He is of the Devil's party, acknowledging the existence of

God's commands but urging rebellion against them. Id.
The abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison might also be seen as a kind of constitutional satanist. He
understood the antebellum Constitution as irredeemably protective of slavery and as a result called
for its destruction. As an especially crafty satanist, however, Garrison attempted to turn the tables

on the constitutional faithful by referring to the Constitution itself as Satan's work, labelling it "a
covenant with Death, and an agreement with Hell." See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION,
supra note 75, at 5 (citing WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963)).
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vocal constitutional atheists is small. 147 This should be no surprise. First, legal
practitioners are unlikely to leave traces of constitutional atheism in their
arguments because doing so would usually be a very ineffective rhetorical
strategy. A constitutional believer, whether fundamentalist or nonfundamentalist, is at least potentially able to argue with sincerity and conviction,
and not only as a performance, that the Constitution demands her preferred
judicial outcome, while the uncompromisingly candid constitutional atheist may
only be able to respond, disappointingly, that the issue is unclear because the
meaning of the Constitution cannot be determined. No matter how descriptively
accurate the atheist's description of the situation, the use of such descriptions
will rarely be the most effective way of achieving practical legal goals.
Second, with regard to both religious and constitutional faith, those who
refuse to worship because they lack belief are less likely to spend their scarce
time and energy debating the details of what they do not believe. A constitutional
atheist may occasionally find it worthwhile to explain why the believers are
wrong. But to the extent that constitutional faith does not rest on ordinary
evidence and thus resists rational contestation-in other words, to the extent that
constitutional faith is indeed afaith-the atheist's criticisms are unlikely to have
much effect. 148 Once the constitutional atheist completes her explanation of the

For one of the rare examples of something approaching constitutional atheism in a Supreme
Court opinion, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 752 (2008) (Kennedy, J.) (noting "[t]here
are reasons to doubt" "that the historical record is complete and that the common law, if properly
understood, yields a definite answer to the questions before us," and partly in light of this
indeterminacy, reaching a decision based instead on prudential considerations). Even in
Boumediene, Justice Kennedy hardly states in explicit terms that he is determining the meaning of
the Constitution based in part, for lack of a better alternative, on his own personal prudential views
of what the Constitution should require.
148
On the resistance of religious belief to rational contestation, see, for example, BRIAN LEITER,
WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 81 (2013) (noting that "some religious beliefs are insulatedfrom
evidence"); Gregory Brazeal, Webs ofFaithas a Source ofReasonableDisagreement, 23 CRITICAL
REv. 421, 423-33 (2011) (describing a mechanism by which some religious beliefs might resist
rational challenge).
147
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believers' errors, 149 there will be little left to say, and the atheist will have good
reason to move on.15 0
D. ConstitutionalFaith Without Fundamentalism

constitutional believer accepts the
The non-fundamentalist
constitutional atheist's premise that constitutional meaning, at least with regard
to the Constitution's rights provisions, is profoundly logically imperfect. But the
constitutional non-fundamentalist also recognizes, unlike both the
fundamentalist and the atheist, that there is something special about the way that
legal assertions of the meaning of the Constitution ("constitutional
interpretations") work, as opposed to scholarly historical claims about the
Constitution and its contents. The non-fundamentalist constitutional believer
accepts that it is proper for constitutional interpretations, like legal discourse in
general, to involve an undifferentiated blending of description and prescription.
As a result, the non-fundamentalist can in good faith fill any logical imperfection
created by her methods of interpretation with determinacy supplied by her own
convictions, her own vision of how the Constitution should be interpreted and
what it should contain.

149
The attitude of the atheist toward the non-fundamentalist believer is less clear, perhaps
because explicit theoretical expressions of non-fundamentalist faith are so rare. One possibility
would be for the atheist to regard the non-fundamentalist believer as merely engaged in cynical
play-acting, or a bad-faith renunciation of agency. The atheist might view the non-fundamentalist
as sharing the point of view of the schoolboy who, according to William James, defined faith as
"when you believe something that you know ain't true." William James, The Will to Believe, in
WRITINGS 1878-1899 (Gerald E. Myers ed., 1992). From this perspective, the nonfundamentalist's persistence in belief despite the lack of ordinary reasons for belief is like the
continuing embrace of ideology by the modem "cynical subject":
Peter Sloterdijk puts forward the thesis that ideology's dominant mode of
functioning [today] is cynical .

. .

. The cynical subject is quite aware of the

distance between the ideological mask and the social reality, but he none the
less still insists upon the mask. The formula .. . Would then be: "they know
very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it." Cynical reason is
no longer naive, but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness: one
knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest hidden
behind an ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it.

212EK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 28 (1989) (citing PETER SLOTERDIJK, THE
CRITIQUE OF CYNICAL REASON (1983)). For Tushnet's critique of some aspects of Balkin's nonfundamentalist project, see TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE, supra note 131, at 326 (suggesting
that Balkin's LIVING ORIGINALISM "uses its own version of originalism ... to defend every result
SLAVOJ

contemporary liberals hope to get out of the Constitution"); Mark Tushnet, Self-Historicism, 38
TULSA L. REV. 771 (2003).
1so
See Mark V. Tushnet, ConstitutionalScholarship: What's Next?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 28,
32 (1988) (noting that he has "just published a book on constitutional theory that [he]
unsurprisingly but undoubtedly erroneously regard as the last word on the subject," and concluding
that it is therefore time "to start doing something else").
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The constitutional non-fundamentalist has faith in her vision of the
Constitution. She does not believe it is true in the same sense or on the same
basis as a historical scholar believes a scholarly claim about the Constitution's
ratification or amendment to be true. She believes her constitutional faith not
based on some deductive or empirical proof available to all disinterested
observers, but at least in part on the basis of her own commitments, including
ideological commitments. These commitments are not the sort of thing that every
reasonable person must accept by virtue of being reasonable. They are more
historically contingent and personal. We might say that the constitutional nonfundamentalist has arrived at the constitutional vision that partly motivates her
interpretations through a leap of faith. She has not relied entirely on reasoning
from neutral principles.
Like a constitutional fundamentalist, someone with a nonfundamentalist constitutional faith might rely on any number of interpretive
methodologies and might favor outcomes of any political valence. In arguing for
her constitutional interpretations, she might appeal, for example, to constitutional
text, structure, original understanding, precedent, or the principles of American
democracy. Indeed, she is free, as is the fundamentalist, to adopt interpretive
methods that are "off-the-wall" in the eyes of the legal profession.' Nonfundamentalism does not imply a commitment to or rejection of any particular
approach to determining constitutional meaning. It is an attitude toward a
constitutional interpretation, an attitude that acknowledges the intermingling of
the descriptive and the prescriptive in legal assertions about what the
Constitution means, and accepts this intermingling as legitimate, as a part of the
form of life in which one engages when one makes constitutional interpretations.
A non-fundamentalist judge would reject the constitutional
fundamentalist's belief that he is nothing more than a neutral umpire, calling
balls and strikes without any concern for their effect. From the nonfundamentalist's point of view, such neutrality is not only an impossible basis
for reaching constitutional decisions in many cases but is simply not how the
practice of constitutional interpretation-asa type of legal discourse-works.
The umpire analogy, in the eyes of the non-fundamentalist, reflects a basic
misunderstanding of the nature of constitutional adjudication, as opposed to
scholarly historical or sociological analysis.
The difference between a fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist
attitude toward a constitutional interpretation may not be apparent simply by
looking at the words of a constitutional advocate in court or of a judge in an
opinion. In theory, a fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist might present
identical arguments leading to identical conclusions. Discerning the difference
in attitude might require asking questions in order to determine whether the

151
See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 75, at 179-82 (discussing off-thewall versus on-the-wall constitutional arguments, and the historical forces that can shift an
argument from off-the-wall to on-the-wall and vice versa).
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speaker recognizes that her view of the Constitution's meaning is not the same
as a neutral description, but is rather premised in part on her prescriptive
commitments, or whether she acknowledges that her interpretation was shaped
by her conception of what is just or fair, her role as an advocate, or some other
source of prescriptive reasoning.1 52
As already noted, 153 where one finds the distinction between
constitutional fundamentalism and non-fundamentalism made most clearly
manifest is in speech and writing that scrutinizes and attempts to make explicit
its own methodological assumptions. As we also saw above,154 examples abound
of constitutional fundamentalism in articulations of constitutional theory by legal
scholars and judges. Examples of non-fundamentalist constitutional theory, like
theoretical expressions of constitutional atheism, are comparatively rare.
The most fully developed expression of non-fundamentalist
constitutional faith is Jack Balkin's ConstitutionalRedemption.15 5 To begin with,
like the constitutional atheist, Balkin acknowledges the logical imperfection of
constitutional meaning. His acknowledgement appears in his discussion of
"constitutional historicism."'`6 He suggests that while
at any point in time legal materials and the internal conventions
of constitutional argument genuinely constrain lawyers and
judges, these materials and conventions are sufficiently flexible
to allow constitutional law to become an important site for
political and social struggle .... The internal norms of good
constitutional legal argument are always changing, and they are
changed by political, social, and historical forces in ways that
the internal norms of legal reasoning do not always directly
acknowledge or sufficiently recognize. 57
This acknowledgement that the constitutional interpretations of lawyers,
judges, activists, and legal scholars-including Balkin's own interpretationsarise in relation to changeable and frequently shifting interpretive norms already

152
Just as it may be difficult to determine whether a speaker has a fundamentalist or nonfundamentalist constitutional attitude at first glance, so certain attitudes may conceivably be
difficult to classify even upon closer analysis. Cf Wittgenstein, Lectures, supra note 25, at 58
("[T]here can easily be imagined transitions where we wouldn't know for our life whether to call
them religious beliefs or scientific beliefs."). But this does not undermine our ability to identify
relatively clear cases, and to distinguish fundamentalism from non-fundamentalism conceptually.
153
See supra Section III.B.
154
See supra Part lII.
155
See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 75.
156
Id. at 177-79.
157
Id. at 177-78; see also id. at 183 (noting that historicism "does not deny that people internal
to the practice of constitutional law hold good-faith views about the best interpretation of the
Constitution, and it does not deny that, viewed from the standpoint of the participants, some
interpretations might be better than others").
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sets Balkin apart from the usual constitutional fundamentalist, who denies the
indeterminacy of constitutional meaning at least in relation to the subject matter
of her own conclusions.
But unlike the atheist, Balkin seems to accept that it is appropriate for a
constitutional interpretation to incorporate both descriptive and prescriptive
reasoning. On the one hand, Balkin emphasizes that constitutional interpretation
is not purely prescriptive. It is not solely an expression of what one wishes to be
the case. It requires fidelity to the Constitution. Balkin writes that "[t]he rhetoric
of legal and political argument alike is premised on the assumption of
fidelity. . . ."'
While in theory someone could disclaim fidelity to the
Constitution and argue, for example, that judges should enforce economic
equality as a constitutional right because it is a good idea regardless of what the
Constitution says, in practice this would violate the norms of constitutional
argument. Invoking the Wittgensteinian notion of "language games," Balkin
notes:
[I]nsisting that one does not care about fidelity does not simply
put one at a severe disadvantage in convincing others to one's
point of view; it takes one outside of the language game of
constitutional interpretation. It is to announce that one is doing
something else-whether it is political theory, economics, or
sociology, but most assuredly not constitutional law.1 59
Similarly, "[fjor a law professor to say that fidelity to the Constitution is
unimportant is to admit that she is no longer doing constitutional law; rather, she
must say that she is faithful to what the Constitution, properly understood,
commands." 60 This is simply the way the game of constitutional interpretation
is played; these are the norms of the practice. 161
On the other hand, Balkin seems to recognize that constitutional
interpretation, as a form of legal discourse, differs from the purely descriptive
discourse of, for example, non-legal scholarship. He remarks that "a political

158
159

160

Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 105. As Balkin also notes:
[C]onstitutional theorists take great pains to demonstrate the fidelity of their
favored constitutional doctrines and their favored methods of constitutional
interpretation. It is not enough that a theory or a doctrinal innovation is a really
good idea; enormous efforts must be expended to show that it is also a faithful
interpretation of the Constitution.

Id.
161
Echoing Kennedy, The HermeneuticsofSuspicion, supra note 61, Balkin notes: "Ofcourse,
one sometimes doubts that particular lawyers and politicians really take constitutional fidelity
seriously. ... That is certainly what lawyers and politicians constantly accuse each other of, even
as they assert that their own interpretations are faithful." BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION,
supra note 75, at 105-06.
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scientist ... is not particularly interested in legitimating the present or criticizing
the current Supreme Court; instead he is urging his fellow political scientists to
take the professional constraints of the law seriously. [Law professors], by
contrast, are engaged in normative and defensive projects."1 62 When Balkin notes
that "fidelity to our Constitution is manufactured" by the "process of raising
arguments and making claims in the name of the Constitution, of persuading
people about what the Constitution really means, and attempting to move
arguments from off-the-wall to on-the-wall," 1 63 he denies that the Constitution
has an ahistorically fixed meaning that could be described with simple,
comprehensive accuracy, thereby ending the constitutional conversation once
and for all. What the Constitution means, his comments suggest, is properly
determined in part by what we think it ought to mean.
The same could not be said of the purely descriptive claims of a political
scientist. No matter how much we might acknowledge the potential for ideology
or other biases to play a role, perhaps in some contexts an unavoidable one, in
shaping a political scientist's choice of projects and methods, we simply would
not say that a political scientist could properly allow her view of what should be
the case to play a determinative role in shaping her conclusions about what is the
case. We do not recognize the propriety of a political scientist, for example,
discarding certain statistical evidence because it conflicts with his view of what
the world should be like. We view the unacknowledged introduction of personal
prescriptive premises into a political scientist's descriptive conclusions as
improper and potentially invalidating.
With regard to constitutional meaning, non-fundamentalists like Balkin
suggest, the principle that prescriptive premises should be cordoned off from
descriptive-sounding legal conclusions simply does not apply. Nor does he
exclude his own constitutional interpretations from his historicism. He does not
lapse into a fundamentalist faith in the purely descriptive ahistorical accuracy of
his own claims. At the same time, unlike the atheist, he presents himself as
believing that his claims are faithful to the meaning of the Constitution. He
rejects an atheistic attitude of disbelief and the refusal to commit to any particular
constitutional understanding:
We believe that our own views are correct; at the same
time, we also understand that people's minds can be changed
and have been changed, including our own.
This dual understanding is not self-undermining, and it
does not involve us in a performative contradiction .... If we
do nothing, and adopt a cynical relativism that holds that one

162

BALIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 75, at 197-98.

163

Id. at 119.
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view is just as good as another, we surrender the constitutional
system's fate into the hands of others. 64
I note that Balkin's particular brand of constitutional faith is not logically
entailed by the idea of constitutional non-fundamentalism. It arises out of his
personal commitment to the redemptive possibilities of the Constitution, and in
particular to a progressive vision of constitutional redemption.' 6 ' Balkin
expresses faith in the capacity-however dormant-of America's constitutional
culture, using the Constitution as an organizing framework, to fulfill the as-yet
unfulfilled promises that Balkin (in a combination of historical description and
personal hope) believes the Constitution contains. At the same time, he
recognizes the evils of the constitutional past and present, the lack of any
guarantee that the constitutional future will be better, and the risk that faith in
the Constitution may distort his own values for the worse.
As Balkin hints in his repeated invocations of a "leap of faith,"l 6 6 his
faith in the redemptive potential of the Constitution can be understood in
Kierkegaardian terms. Like Kierkegaard's non-fundamentalist "knight of faith,"
who recognizes that his faith lacks rational grounds but nevertheless believes "by
virtue of the absurd," 6 7 Balkin recognizes that his commitment to the
Constitution is not supported by a chain of public reasons to which any rational
person would inevitably assent if she thought about the Constitution long
enough. Rather, Balkin's leap of constitutional faith exceeds what value-neutral
reasoning could justify. It springs from a personal conmiitment to the
Constitution and its promise, a commitment that someone lacking faith might
well dismiss as absurd.1 6 8

16

Id. at 184.

Id. at 18-25 (sketching a vision of American constitutional redemption that, like Lincoln's
vision in the Gettysburg Address, places at its core the proposition in the Declaration of
Independence "that all men are created equal").
166
Id. at 6, 48, 84, 124.
167
See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING 40 (C. Stephen Evans & Sylvia Walsh
eds., 2006). The non-fundamentalist believer's position that neutral standards of reason provide an
inadequate basis for supporting religious belief is also associated with Blaise Pascal. See, e.g.,
BLAISE PASCAL, PENStES AND OTHER WRITINGS 157 (Anthony Levi ed., Honor Levi trans., 2008)
("It is the heart that feels God, not reason: that is what faith is."); id. at 65-66 ("1 see several
opposing religions, all except one of them false. Each wants to be believed on its own authority
and threatens those who do not believe. I therefore do not believe them on that account.").
Contemporary philosophers sometimes refer to the denigration of reason as a basis for religious
faith as "fideism."
168
In a manner that echoes another aspect of some non-fundamentalist approaches to religious
faith, Balkin has also defended the value of a certain notion of "myth" against scientistic dismissal.
In response to Ackerman's denunciation of "what he calls the 'myth of rediscovery' in American
constitutional law-the notion that we can justify major transformations . . . as a return to original
principles and commitments," Balkin writes:
165
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Balkin's constitutional faith also recognizes, again like the faith of
Kierkegaard's exemplary knight, 16 9 that there is no guarantee that the
Constitution's promise will be fulfilled, and no security from the risk that
commitment to the Constitution will become idolatry-faith in something that
does not deserve our faith:
The Constitution might ultimately let us down, either because its
institutions are faulty or because the American people acting
through those institutions make unwise decisions and tragic
errors. It might ultimately turn out to be Garrison's covenant
with death and agreement with hell. Even so, to faithfully
interpret the Constitution, we must have faith in the
Constitution, and we must take that risk. 70
When Balkin describes the details of his faith in constitutional
redemption, he offers an illustration of the way that non-fundamentalist
constitutional faith self-consciously blends descriptive and prescriptive aspects.
After telling a story of constitutional meaning that deals in part with how the
"transformation of society into a truly democratic culture"' 71 would vindicate
promises of the Declaration of Independence, Balkin notes:
So there is the story. I think it is a good story. Perhaps you will
disagree. Everything in it is true, as best as I can tell. But of
course, I left some things out and emphasized others. I offered
my interpretation of the facts, and asked you to agree with my
interpretation. That is how one argues with stories.172
Unlike a constitutional fundamentalist, Balkin does not present his
constitutional theory as a purely descriptive account with which any disinterested
observer should agree as a rational matter, regardless of the observer's values.
He does not present his interpretation of the Constitution as neutral. Rather, he

I disagree that the "myth of rediscovery" is a myth in the pejorative sense that
Ackerman means to convey-a false story that obfuscates the truth about
social life. Rather, myths are stories that reveal deep verities about the human
condition. So it is with our life as a constitutional community.
Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427,
521-22 (2007); cf, ARMSTRONG, supra note 16, at xv-xvii (defending mythos as valid alternative
to logos, rather than failed instance of logos).
169

Kierkegaard's knight of faith recognizes that he takes a risk through his unconditional

commitment to his beloved. His beloved, as a finite being, could be lost at any moment, and this
loss would destroy him. Yet he commits himself to her anyway, aware of and yet unwilling to be
swayed by the sword of Damocles hanging by a thread above her. See KIERKEGAARD, supra note

167, at 43.
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BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 75, at 125.

171

Id. at 25.

I72

Id.
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acknowledges that the theory is shaped by his personal commitments. As he
writes elsewhere, this kind of constitutional theory or story "is true for you
because it is part of you, because you see yourself as part of it."1 73 Nevertheless,
he believes the story. Unlike a constitutional atheist, he is able to say that it is
true to the meaning of the Constitution.1 74
As an expression of non-fundamentalist constitutional faith, Balkin's
theory can also be distinguished from a non-fundamentalist attitude without faith.
The latter is the as-yet unexplored fourth option made possible by the
combination of our two binary variables: fundamentalism versus nonfundamentalism, belief versus non-belief. This Article might itself be seen as an
illustration of a non-fundamentalist attitude without faith, in the sense that it
makes no legal or constitutional claims, but instead limits itself to purely
descriptive, generally anthropological or sociological statements about the law
and legal practices. Rather than exploring the many other aspects of Balkin's
theory that might be described as illustrations of constitutional faith without
fundamentalism, I would like to close by situating Balkin's non-fundamentalist
faith in constitutional redemption in a larger tradition of American thought. In
particular, Balkin's arguments bear a striking structural resemblance to those
made by the philosopher Richard Rorty in his 1998 book Achieving Our
Country.'7 5 Like Balkin, Rorty argues that it is possible to reconcile a recognition

'7

Id. at 32.

174
See, e.g., id. at 138. It is worth emphasizing Balkin's insistence that a constitutional faith
cannot simply be an expression of one's own values. It must be faithful to the Constitution. See
id. at 28 (insisting that a narrative argument concerning the meaning of the Constitution does not
"simply reduce[]" to an expression of "natural law or best consequences," but is constrained by
fidelity to the promises made by We the People, which may be different than the promises made

by a different people with a different history). Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of
Balkin's constitutional faith is his insistence on distinguishing it from the "happy talk" of what he
calls "Ideal Constitutionalism," the attempt

to dissolve the problem of constitutional evil by distinguishing an ideal
Constitution from past interpretations of the Constitution and past actions done
in the name of the Constitution. It hopes to separate the "real" or "true"
Constitution from unworthy parts of the constitutional tradition and even from
positive constitutional law.
Id. at 112. As Balkin acknowledges, however, the line between such Ideal Constitutionalism and
charitable interpretations of the Constitution, such as the one underlying his own aspirational
constitutional faith, is not always clear. He presents Ideal Constitutionalism as an excessive form

of aspiration, one that denies the reality of constitutional evil even in the past and present, rather
than seeing that evil as something to be overcome. "This practice is an exaggeration of a perfectly
normal feature of interpretation, and so it is hard to tell where interpretation ends and conformation
[that is, improperly conforming the object of interpretation to our sense of what is just,] begins."
Id.
1s

RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY

AMERICA (1998) [hereinafter RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY]. The title comes from some of
the closing lines of James Baldwin's The FireNext Time:
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of the failures and evils of America's past and present with a belief in the promise
of America's future.' 76 Like Balkin, Rorty prefers to criticize these failures and
evils as a betrayal of American ideals than as an embodiment of what America
stands for. 177
Perhaps because Rorty tended to abjure religious vocabularies, he
presents his argument not as a defense offaith but of national pride; and perhaps
because Rorty was a philosopher working in a comparative literature department
rather than a professor of constitutional law, he places a greater emphasis on the
writings of Whitman and Dewey than on the text of the Constitution. But like
Balkin, Rorty presents his argument as appealing to a narrative.'17 Rorty calls
for a renewed national pride based on a narrative of hoped-for future progress
that avoids both the self-disgusted anti-Americanism associated with the
spectatorial academic Left and the "simpleminded militaristic chauvinism"
associated with some representations of the United States in popular culture.' 79
Like Balkin, Rorty takes inspiration for his favored American narrative in part
from the rhetoric of the Gettysburg Address.' 80

If we-and now I mean the relatively conscious whites and the relatively
conscious blacks, who must, like lovers, insist on, or create, the consciousness
of the others-do not falter in our duty now, we may be able, handful that we
are, to end the racial nightmare, and achieve our country, and change the
history of the world.
JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 119 (1963).
176
See RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, supra note 175, at 3-4 (noting the importance of
reminding the "country of what it can take pride in as well as what it should be ashamed of," and
criticizing most popular and elite cultural descriptions of America's near future for being "written
in tones either of self-mockery or self-disgust").
177
See id. at 3 ("Emotional involvement with one's country-feelings of intense shame or of
glowing pride aroused by various parts of its history, and by various present-day national
policies-is necessary if political deliberation is to be imaginative and productive."); id. at 7
(criticizing those who "associate American patriotism with an endorsement of atrocities").
178
See id. at 3 ("Those who hope to persuade a nation to exert itself . . must tell inspiring
stories about episodes and figures in the nation's past .... ). Also similar to Balkin, Rorty
recognizes that "[s]tories about what a nation has been and should try to be are not attempts at
accurate representation, but rather attempts to forge a moral identity." Id. at 13; cf BALKIN,

CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 75, at 17-32.
17
Iso

RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, supra note 175, at 4.

Id. at 8. Indeed, Lincoln's use of the Gettysburg Address can itself be seen as a central
example of the kind of redemptive reinterpretation of American ideals advocated by Balkin and
Rorty. See generally GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE

AMERICA (1992) (presenting the Gettysburg Address as a redemptive reinterpretation of America's
constitutional tradition with the commitment to equality in the Declaration of Independence at its
foundation). A more recent example appears in President Obama's speech commemorating the
fiftieth anniversary of the Selma to Montgomery civil rights marches:
What greater expression of faith in the American experiment than this, what
greater form of patriotism is there than the belief that America is not yet
finished, that we are strong enough to be self-critical, that each successive
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Rorty's call to "achieve our country," rather than assuming it has already
been achieved, or viewing America as corrupt to its core and not worth achieving,
bears remarkable similarities to Balkin's call to redeem the promises of the
American constitutional tradition. Both Rorty and Balkin recognize that their
values are the result of historical contingencies rather than being secured by some
ahistorical rational foundation. Yet both remain conmitted to their values and to
the project of national redemption.s'8 Finally, both recognize that the project, by
its nature, will never be complete.' 8 2
An enduring value of Rorty's and Balkin's projects, especially in the
current state of our politics,1 83 is to show that belief in a possible narrative of
American redemption does not require blindness to past and present American
evils.1 84 Their projects do not require a fundamentalist denial of what is known
generation can look upon our imperfections and decide that it is in our power

to remake this nation to more closely align with our highest ideals?
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the 50th Anniversary of the Selma to
Montgomery Marches (Mar. 7, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/03/07/remarks-president-50th-anniversary-selma-montgomery-marches.
Even more
recently, Justice Anthony Kennedy struck a note of redemptive constitutionalism in an opinion
expanding the right of criminal defendants to challenge racial bias in juries: "It must become the
heritage of our Nation to rise above racial classifications that are so inconsistent with our

commitment to the equal dignity of all persons." Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867
(2017). Kennedy does not state that it already is the heritage of the United States to reject such
racial subordination, nor that we must deny our heritage because of the deep roots of racial
subordination within it. Id. Rather, he calls for the United States to become a nation with a

heritage-an identity rooted (perhaps paradoxically) in the past-of rising above racial
subordination. Id.
181
The awareness of the determining force of such contingencies, even on one's own values
and beliefs, is what Rorty called being an "ironist." See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY,
AND SOLIDARITY 73 (1989). Just as Balkin maintains faith in the Constitution despite his awareness

of constitutional historicism, Rorty maintains an arguably faith-like commitment to his ideals of
social solidarity, artistic self-creation, and the American project of Dewey and Whitman despite
conceiving of himself as an ironist. Id. Again, the rational (or irrational) structure of the
commitment loosely resembles that of Kierkegaard's knight of faith. Cf Barry Allen, Ironic Life,
NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVS. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/ronic-life/ (reviewing RICHARD
J. BERNSTEIN, IRONIC LIFE (2016)) (noting that "Rorty's liberal ironist is an American version of

Kierkegaard's knight of faith," a figure who does not stop with the "[r]omantic ironist" at
"[a]bsolute negativity," but instead commits herself to her contingent ideals with "[e]thical

passion"). Id.
182

Compare BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 75, at 25, 102, with RORTY,

ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY, supra note 175, at 119.
183
In fact, since the election of President Donald Trump, Rorty's book has drawn renewed
attention for a prophetic passage in which he suggested that white working class voters, abandoned
to economic stagnation, might one day turn to a strongman for revenge against contemptuous elites.
See Jennifer Senior, RichardRorty's 1998 Book SuggestedElection 2016 Was Coming, N.Y. TIMES

(Nov.
20,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/2 1/books/richard-rortys- 1998-booksuggested-election-2016-was-coming.html.
I use the term "evils" to highlight the extent to which a redemptive faith can make
room for,
in theory, any act, any atrocity, no matter how abhorrent-from colonial genocide to slavery. The
84
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to be true, nor a naive or hypocritical American exceptionalism, nor a Whiggish
belief in the inevitability of progress. Just as Balkin's constitutional faith
recognizes itself to be an expression of faith rather than a disinterested historical
description, so Rorty's invocation of James Baldwin's plea does not depend on
the illusion that the ideals they want to achieve were shared by slaveowners two
centuries before.
IV. CONCLUSION

Leibniz had a dream that law could become, in the words of one
historian, a "deductive science on the model of classical geometry" and that legal
reasoning could be made to "follow the deductive, demonstrative model used in
geometric proofs."' 8 5 From his student Christian Freiherr von Wolff, to Freidrich
Carl von Savigny, to John Austin, to Christopher Columbus Langdell, and
beyond, the formalist dream of producing legal certainty through deduction has
captivated the minds of legal theorists.186 If law were a kind of science or

greater the sin, the more powerful the need for redemption. Far from inviting complacency or selfcongratulation, as critics of redemptive constitutionalism might argue, the redemptive project
demands action, and is also entirely compatible with a recognition that the ideal may never be
achieved. As Balkin's and Rorty's work shows, the redemptive project need not entail a
commitment to the uncritical "American creedalist" claims of, for example, SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY (1983), which argues that "most

elements in American society" "[s]ince the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century" have
supported an "American Creed" whose "central elements have changed relatively little" and
include "liberty, equality, individualism, democracy, and the rule of law under a constitution," as
"set forth succinctly in the Declaration of Independence." Id. at 14. Redemptive nationalist

projects, whether focused on the Constitution like Balkin's or more generally on American identity
like Rorty's, are entirely compatible with an empirical, historical recognition that the central
ideological commitments of various parts of American society have often included elements
outside of Huntington's list, including, for example, white supremacy, and have often changed
over the last two centuries. It is Balkin's and Rorty's recognition that the kinds of claims they are
making regarding the contents of the Constitution or of "American identity" are not simply neutral,
dispassionate, uncommitted observations that marks their projects as non-fundamentalist.
It is true, as Aziz Rana suggests in Freedom Struggles and the Limits of ConstitutionalContinuity,
71 MD. L. REv. 1015, 1020-21 (2012) (citing MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL
CRITICISM 38-40 (1993)), that there are risks to the kind of immanent critique that redemptive
constitutionalism necessarily entails. But the risks hardly seem greater than those involved in the
available alternatives, including Rana's proposal to channel progressive political energies toward
the radical external critique of American identity as inherently settler colonialist, and of American
history as inexorably tragic. See id. at 1046-51; Aziz RANA, THE Two FACES OF AMERICAN
FREEDOM 3 (2014). Even if one were to share the radical Left's often expansive faith in the
emancipatory and egalitarian potential of spontaneous popular democracy, it is difficult to imagine
a strategy of harsh condemnation from an alien perspective, delivered in a litany of hopelessness,
proving effective in any actually existing political culture.
185
M. H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Sciencefrom Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 95, 100 (1986).
16
Id. at 102-21.
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geometry, then legal reasoning might escape the corrupting influence of the
personal morality or political ideology of judges. The Justices of our Supreme
Court could function as mere umpires, calling balls and strikes. They could arrive
at their conclusions based simply on what the law is, not on what they believe it
ought to be. Law could be kept free from the contamination of politics, thereby
securing the validity and legitimacy of the rule of law lying at the foundation of
the liberal state.
This Article has assumed that legal realists and other critics of "the abuse
of deduction"' 8 7 are correct in concluding that law is not and cannot be a
deductive science in this sense. A system of laws stated in natural language
cannot function as a logically perfect deductive system. Nor can the nonrs of the
relevant interpretive communities, nor the underlying spirit, purposes, or norms
of the legal order, entirely supply what is lacking in the determinacy of raw
natural language legal rules.
There are many possible ways to reject the assumption that the rule of
law, in the senses that matter to contemporary opponents of arbitrary, unequal,
and authoritarian rule, requires that the law be strictly quarantined from the
prescriptive commitments of its interpreters.' 8 8 Indeed, if the rule of law requires
that interpreters of the law derive its contents entirely without regard for their
views of what the law should be, then the rule of law has never existed and will
never exist. So long as appeals to the law continue to be made, it is practically
unavoidable that those appeals will be presented and settled through what this
Article has termed legal discourse, a distinctive social practice combining
descriptive and prescriptive reasoning but whose conclusions are stated simply
as descriptions of what the law is.' 89 Nothing prevents us from viewing such
discourse, atheistically, as merely a form of mystification intended to obscure
from disputants the role of the adjudicator in constructing the authority to which
she appeals. The purpose of this Article has been to suggest, however, that an
alternative view is at least conceptually possible.

187

Kennedy, The Hermeneutics of Suspicion, supra note 61, at 99 (citing FRANtOIS GtNY,

MtTHODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVi POSITIF (1899)).

188

The critical liberal political theorist Judith Shklar's writings on law provide one example.

See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
POLITICAL THINKERS 21, 31 (1998) (presenting courts and lawyers as "parts of a single political

continuum on which other public agencies are also placed according to their degree of courtlikeness," and noting that courts may nonetheless "have their own characteristic procedures or
roles" which need not "constitute some sort of fraudulent charade to hide the actuality of
oppression"); accord JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS X-Xii

(1986).
189

Indeed, this discursive structure may arise in any social practice-including explicitly

religious ones-in which an interpreter has responsibility for specifying the contents of a logically
imperfect source of authority, where different specifications will lead to outcomes favored by
different interests. The interpreter will have an incentive to enhance the legitimacy of her declared
conclusion by presenting it as merely a description of what the authority decrees, uninfluenced by
her views of what should be the case.
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